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INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute (ALI) published its first-ever Restatement
on the subject of liability insurance in 2019.1 The project’s completion
ended an eight-year saga within the ALI for what proved to be one of the
most controversial work products in the organization’s nearly 100-year
history.2 The controversy surrounding this ALI Restatement of Law, both
then and now, is the charge that the work product fails to faithfully
“restate” prevailing liability insurance rules, and instead represents an
effort to reshape the contours of liability insurance law through novel
recommended rules for courts to adopt.3 Adding to the controversy is the
charge that the Restatement’s novel rule formulations consistently operate
to enhance the potential liability of insurers, a result that may signal a
project bias against insurers.4
Even before the ALI issued its final published version of this
1. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (recommending
common law liability insurance rules).
2. See infra Part II; see also Stephen Pate, The ALI’s Restatement of the Law on
Liability Insurance, LAW.COM (May 29, 2018) (recognizing that the RLLI “encountered a
storm of controversy”).
3. See, e.g., Letter from Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison, to David F. Levi, ALI
President, and Roberta Cooper Ramo, ALI Council Chair (Jan. 8, 2018) (on file with author)
(providing “section-by-section explanation of the core areas of concern together with
proposed changes to the black-letter rules” and appendix of submissions urging changes to
the RLLI); Peter Y. Solmssen, Statement Regarding Revisions Since the 2017 Omnibus
Motion to Recommit Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance (presented at 2018 ALI
Annual Meeting) (detailing in appendix novel RLLI sections); Peter Y. Solmssen et al.,
Omnibus Motion to Recommit Sections of Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance
(presented at 2017 ALI Annual Meeting) (requesting, in a motion by 20 ALI members,
revisions to numerous RLLI sections and including appendices providing case law support
for requested changes); Letter from 27 General Counsel to ALI President David F. Levi
(Dec. 1, 2017) (on file with author) (expressing fundamental concerns with RLLI); see also
infra Part III.
4. See sources cited supra note 3; Jeff Sistrunk, 5 Controversial Rules in the ALI’s
Insurance Law Project, LAW360 (May 18, 2018, 5:02 PM) (discussing several controversial
RLLI provisions); Laura Foggan, ALI Restatement Should Not Reflect Aspirational
Proposals, LAW360 (May 17, 2018) (arguing that the RLLI should reflect settled insurance
law rather than aspirational proposals); A. Hugh Scott, Why Criticism of ALI’s Insurance
Restatement Is Valid, LAW360 (May 10, 2017) (suggesting that the RLLI will affect
insurance law in ways that may adversely impact liability insurers).
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Restatement, backlash against the project was brewing in state legislatures.
In 2018, Ohio and Michigan enacted prophylactic laws stating that the
Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance (RLLI) does not constitute the
public policy of the state and should not be relied upon by courts.5 In 2019,
prior to the RLLI’s final publication, North Dakota and Arkansas enacted
similar laws.6 Other states have also adopted resolutions or considered
legislation with the same basic objective.7 At the same time, a growing
volume of media coverage,8 articles,9 symposiums,10 judicial education
programs,11 and legal scholarship12 have examined aspects of the RLLI.
5. S.B. 239, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2018) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3901.82 (West 2018)); H.B. 6520, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2018) (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3032 (West 2020)).
6. H.B. 1142, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.102); S.B. 565, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 2360-112 (2019)).
7. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 62, 121st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019) (enacted) (stating
that the RLLI does not reflect state law or state public policy and should not be afforded
recognition by courts as an authoritative reference regarding established rules and principles
of insurance law); S.R. 149, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019) (enacted) (stating that the
RLLI does not constitute state public policy to the extent it is inconsistent or in conflict with
Louisiana law); H.R. 222, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) (enacted) (urging
courts not to rely on the RLLI as an authoritative reference); see also Idaho S.B. 1176, 65th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2019) (providing that the RLLI is not a source of state law and
“shall not be recognized”).
8. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Beware of Even the Fine Print, Attorneys Warn of ALI’s
Insurance Law Restatement, PA. REC. (Apr. 8, 2019), https://pennrecord.com/stories/512412
749-beware-of-even-the-fine-print-attorneys-warn-of-ali-s-insurance-law-restatement [https:
//perma.cc/PFQ8-WE56] (discussing University of Connecticut Law School conference
focused on RLLI); ‘That Can’t Be Right’: Group Defending Disputed Insurance Law
Project Gets Judges Involved, FORBES (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legaln
ewsline/2019/02/20/that-cant-be-right-group-defending-disputed-insurance-law-project-gets
-judges-involved/#15105c52581b
[https://perma.cc/K2J6-Q9RH]
(discussing
ALI
sponsored judicial education program in Houston, Texas about the RLLI).
9. See sources cited supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., University of Connecticut School of Law, “The ALI’s Restatement of the
Law, Liability Insurance: Was the World Turned Upside Down?” (Apr. 5, 2019) (presented
jointly by the Insurance Law Center at University of Connecticut School of Law, The
Connecticut Bar Association’s Insurance Law Section, and Rutgers Center for Risk and
Responsibility).
11. See, e.g., Kim Marrkand, ALI Shouldn’t ‘Teach’ Insurance Restatement in a
Courthouse, LAW360 (Feb. 11, 2019) (discussing ALI judicial education program for federal
judges in Texas regarding the RLLI).
12. See, e.g., Michael F. Aylward & Vanita M. Banks, The Fight for Plain Meaning:
How the ALI Renounced the “Plain-Meaning” Rule for Insurance Policies Before Finally
Embracing It (but Did They Really?), 13 IN-HOUSE DEF. Q. 6 (2018) (arguing that the
RLLI’s approach to the “plain meaning” rule will lead to legal disputes); Michael
Menapace, Going Beyond the Four Corners to Deny a Defense: A Critique of Section 13(3)
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This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the RLLI to answer
the basic question of whether the controversy and criticisms surrounding
the project are well founded or are overstated. The article’s objective is to
assist judges and others unsure of what to make of this Restatement a lens
through which to evaluate the project objectively. Part I discusses the
ALI’s traditional mission and development process for a Restatement, as
well as the unique history of the RLLI’s development. This background
provides important context on the RLLI’s overall design and evolution,
which culminated in a controversial final work product. Part II examines
ten of the RLLI’s most contentious topics and provisions, explaining how a
number of them depart from prevailing common law rules in novel ways.
Part III provides an overall assessment of the RLLI and its combination of
novel recommended rules and rules with very limited legal support, and the
project’s potential to significantly augment the liability insurance landscape
if adopted by courts.
The article concludes that courts should view the RLLI with caution
because the final work product is plainly not a pure “restatement” of
existing common law. Rather, the RLLI contains various aspirational
provisions that would increase insurers’ liability and costs if adopted by
courts. The RLLI also recommends adoption of various minority rules,
which although not improper for inclusion in a Restatement, would
likewise increase insurers’ liability and costs. Thus, when viewed in
totality, the RLLI proposes dramatic changes to liability insurance law that
would, with few exceptions, disadvantage insurers. The comparatively
one-sided nature of the project lends support to criticisms by ALI members,
insurers, and others that the RLLI should not carry the same level of
influence with courts as other ALI Restatements of Law.
I.

PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

The ALI is the most influential private organization in the
development of American law.13
Its influence is due to a reputation
cultivated over nearly a century for presenting carefully considered,

of the Restatement of Liability Insurance, 53 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 795 (2018)
(analyzing and proposing alternative language for the RLLI); George L. Priest, A Principled
Approach Toward Insurance Law: The Economics of Insurance and the Current
Restatement Project, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 635 (2017) (expressing the view that the
RLLI fails to properly consider economic implications of proposed rules).
13. See About ALI, ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ [https://perma.cc/AB9T-Q8AC]
(“The American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the United States
producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise improve the law.”).
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balanced legal rules and policy.14 The organization leverages the collective
expertise of a membership comprised of many of the nation’s most
distinguished judges, law professors, and practitioners to develop a variety
of work products with different objectives and audiences.15 The ALI is
perhaps best known for developing Restatements of Law addressed to
judges to assist their development of the common law. Courts in every
state have, at some point, relied upon an ALI Restatement of Law when
developing state common law.16
A. Overview of Restatement Development Process
Restatements are supposed to set forth “clear formulations of common
law . . . as it presently stands or might appropriately be stated by a court.”17
The ALI’s guidelines for developing Restatements expressly state that the
organization, as an unelected body, “has limited competence and no special
authority to make major innovations in matters of public policy.”18
Accordingly, recommended “[w]ild swings [in law] are inconsistent with
the work of . . . a Restatement.”19
Restatement authors (called
“Reporters”), who are law professors selected by the ALI, are directed to

14. See id. (stating that the organization was founded in 1923 and that its projects are
“enormously influential in the courts and legislatures, as well as in legal scholarship and
education”); see also Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The American Law
Institute at the Cross Road: With Power Comes Responsibility, 2 NAT’L FOUND. FOR JUD.
EXCELLENCE, May 22, 2017 (discussing the ALI’s influence).
15. The ALI publishes three basic work products: (1) Restatements; (2) Model Laws;
and (3) Principles. Each work product has a specific purpose and audience for the
development of the law. See supra note 13; see also Charles W. Wolfram, Bismarck’s
Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 817 (1998) (expressing the
view of Chief Reporter for the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers that “the
composite wisdom of many fine minds who have cared deeply about the quality of [ALI]
products has created an organization that may, for its time and in this place, work about as
well as is realistically imaginable.”).
16. See, e.g., Dominick Vetri, The Integration of Tort Law Reforms and Liability
Insurance Ratemaking in the New Age, 66 OR. L. REV. 277, 284 n.34 (1987) (“After the
American Law Institute adopted section 402A in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
virtually every state has adopted some version of strict products liability.”). The
proliferation of the doctrine of strict products liability provides just one example, albeit a
major one, of the influence of ALI Restatements. Other examples include the ALI’s
Restatement multi-edition projects on contracts, property, agency, and trusts.
17. AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A
HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 3 (rev. ed. 2015)
[hereinafter “ALI STYLE MANUAL”].
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id.
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adhere to four “principal elements” in developing a Restatement.20 These
elements include instructions to: 1) “ascertain the nature of the majority
rule” on a topic; 2) “ascertain trends in the law”; 3) choose the “specific
rule [that] fits best with the broader body of law and therefore leads to
more coherence in the law”; and 4) “ascertain the relative desirability of
competing rules.”21 Rules put forth by the Reporters “are constrained by
the need to find support in sources of law.”22
To assist Reporters in developing a Restatement, the ALI convenes an
Advisers Committee of appointed ALI members who possess expertise in
the subject area to be restated, as well as a Members Consultative Group
(MCG) of ALI members with an interest in the project.23 These
committees meet periodically to discuss project drafts prepared by the
Reporters; each draft typically deals with a portion of the project. Drafts
discussed at the committee level are then revised and presented to the
ALI’s governing Council for a vote of approval, and to the general
membership at the ALI’s annual meeting for a vote of tentative approval.24
Once the ALI Council and general membership approve all of a
Restatement’s installment drafts, the entire project is voted upon for final
approval by the membership.25
For most of the ALI’s history, this vetting process has resulted in
balanced, authoritative work products that educate judges on prevailing
common law rules.26 Modern Restatements, however, have increasingly
come under criticism for departing from the ALI’s mission to promote
clarity and uniformity in the law to instead advocate for legal system
reform through aspirational rules.27 The late U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia recognized this trend in 2015, stating:
20. Id. at 13.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6.
23. See ALI, RULES OF THE COUNCIL 10–12 (2017), https://www.ali.org/media/filer_pub
lic/2c/cc/2ccc0569-8893-454e-a197-9f33a15ff31e/council-rules-2017-10.pdf [https://perma.
cc/TW2L-VRRN] (discussing steps to assist Reporters in developing a Restatement).
24. See id. at 12. (discussing the ALI committees).
25. See id. (setting forth the steps for approving a Restatement draft).
26. See Norman L. Greene, The American Law Institute: A Selective Perspective on the
Restatement Process, 62 HOWARD L. REV. 511, 520 (2019) (noting ALI’s “impressive
vetting process,” but recommending changes to improve voting process for Restatements).
27. See David A. Logan, When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious
Case of the “Flagrant Trespasser,” 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1481–82 (2011)
(examining a novel land possessor duty of care recommended in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm); Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of the
Restatement and of the Common Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 595, 603–04 (2014) (stating “it is
an open question whether the Restatements will . . . unify and improve the common law”).
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[M]odern Restatements . . . are of questionable value, and must
be used with caution. The object of the original Restatements
was ‘to present an orderly statement of the general common law.’
Over time, the Restatements’ authors have abandoned the
mission of describing the law, and have chosen instead to set
forth their aspirations for what the law ought to be.28
Justice Scalia added that where Restatement provisions endeavor to
revise rather than restate existing law, they “should be given . . . no more
weight regarding what the law ought to be than the recommendations of
any respected lawyer or scholar.”29
Enter the RLLI. In 2010, the ALI initiated its first-ever project on the
topic of insurance. This project, which was also the ALI’s first work
product directed at a specific industry, began as a “Principles of Law”
project to assist judges, legislators, and other policymakers in their
development of liability insurance law.30 ALI Principles projects, unlike
Restatements, do not require a grounding in existing case law.31 Rather, the
Reporters have latitude to develop rules and principles in line with their
policy preferences of what the law “should be” on a particular topic. This
ALI foray into insurance law proceeded as a Principles project for four
years, during which time thirty-four sections of liability insurance law
“principles”––comprising more than half of the entire project––were
approved by the ALI Council and ALI membership.32
Near the end of 2014, the ALI’s leadership announced that the
Principles of the Law, Liability Insurance would be changed into a
Restatement (i.e. the RLLI).33 This decision to convert a pending
Principles project into a Restatement was unprecedented in the ALI’s
28. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
29. Id.
30. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. introductory cmt. at ix (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 9, 2013) (proposing initial chapter on “Basic Liability Insurance
Contract Principles”); see also Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Encouraging
Constructive Conduct by Policyholders in the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance,
68 RUTGERS L. REV. 455, 455 (2015) (discussing early versions of the RLLI).
31. See ALI STYLE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 13–15 (discussing how Principles
projects differ from Restatements).
32. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS., introductory cmt. at ix (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2 (revised), July 23, 2014) (discussing the ALI’s foray into liability
insurance law).
33. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. at xiii (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft
No. 1, Mar. 2, 2015) (stating that the draft RLLI contains revisions of the original Principles
of the Law); see also Schwartz & Appel, supra note 30, at 458–59 (discussing project
conversion).
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history.34 The decision appeared motivated at least in part to address broad
and mounting concerns by members of the insurer community––including
the withdrawal of an appointed insurer liaison to the project––regarding
numerous Principles project “innovations” that threatened to disrupt
longstanding liability insurance law practices and dramatically expand
insurers’ liability.35 Recasting the project as a Restatement offered a
potential means to revisit some of the controversial, and potentially
unworkable, aspirational provisions of the Principles project that had been
approved previously by the ALI Council and ALI membership.36
A pervasive problem throughout the four-year development of the
Principles project, which continued throughout the RLLI’s development,
was a lack of subject matter expertise on the part of many ALI members.
Unlike other subjects that have been restated, such as contract law, torts or
property, which every attorney at least learns in law school, most ALI
members possess no specialized knowledge of insurance law. As a result,
the traditional checks and balances for vetting an ALI work product likely
suffered because comparatively fewer ALI members possessed the
requisite knowledge of insurance law to appreciate the nuances and
potential novelty of proposed liability insurance rules. This lack of
specialized expertise may have resulted in greater-than-usual deference
given to the project Reporters with respect to proposed rules.
The change from a Principles project, which permits aspirational
rules, to the RLLI, which is designed to “restate” only existing common
law rules, moved the ALI into uncharted territory. Prior votes approving
the project’s first two chapters (i.e. more than half of the project) were
discarded so that the project could be evaluated anew under the more
rigorous scrutiny traditionally applied to a Restatement.37 The initial draft
34. The ALI leadership also approved a project conversion in the opposite direction.
The ALI’s Restatement of Data Privacy Principles project, which was unique in including
both the “Restatement” and “Principles” labels, was changed into a Principles project in
2014 and relabeled the Principles of the Law, Data Privacy. RESTATEMENT OF DATA
PRIVACY PRINCIPLES (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2014). This Principles
project was completed in 2019.
35. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS., at xvii (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No.
1, Apr. 9, 2013) (noting that “Chapter 2 does contain some innovations”); see also Priest,
supra note 12, at 636 (stating that the project was changed to Restatement for “reasons that
are not totally clear”).
36. See Letter from Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison, and other insurer counsel to
RLLI Reporters (Dec. 22, 2014) (providing appendix detailing sections of prior Principles
project without legal authority).
37. See ALI STYLE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 4, 8 (stating that guidelines for
Restatement “aim to ‘restate’ legal propositions as precisely and coherently as possible” in
comparison to Principles projects which may cover “an area [which] is so new that there is
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of the newly minted RLLI, however, retained many of the novel provisions
that had generated major concerns.38 This first draft of the RLLI, issued in
March 2015, was also scheduled for a vote to reapprove the project’s first
two chapters as Restatement provisions at the ALI’s Annual Meeting in
May 2015, a mere two months after the entire work product was ostensibly
recast in part to shore up the project’s common law foundation.39 The ALI
leadership ultimately postponed the vote to allow additional consideration
of the project by the Reporters and the membership.
The RLLI’s development continued for the next three years under a
cloud of controversy.40 Insurers, whose interests were represented in part
by a new insurer liaison appointed to the project, objected to numerous
provisions, discussed below, on the basis that the RLLI’s proposed rule
formulations failed to reflect existing law.41 A number of ALI members
with expertise in liability insurance law expressed similar concerns.42 They
little established law”).
38. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS., at ix (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft
No. 1, Mar. 2, 2015) (summarizing the few “significant changes” to the first two chapters of
the RLLI compared to the previous Principles).
39. See id.; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS., at xiii (AM. LAW INST., Discussion
Draft, Apr. 30, 2015) (stating that Chapters 1 and 2 are to be discussed by the Reporters at
the 2015 ALI Annual Meeting); see also Letter from Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison,
to RLLI Reporters (Apr. 20, 2015) (on file with author) (urging Reporters not to present
draft Restatement for vote at 2015 ALI Annual Meeting based on concerns with project).
40. See supra notes 3–12 (expressing the controversy surrounding the RLLI); Victor E.
Schwartz, Motion to Postpone Final Vote or Alternatively Recommit Sections of Proposed
Final Draft of Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance (presented at 2017 ALI Annual
Meeting) (proposing to postpone project vote based on novel RLLI provisions); Letter from
Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison, to ALI Council Members and Emeriti regarding
Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance (Oct. 14, 2015) (on file with author) (urging
ALI Council to defer any final vote on Chapters 1 and 2 in light of pervasive concerns);
infra Part 0.
41. See, e.g., Letter from Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison, to David F. Levi, ALI
President, and Roberta Cooper Ramo, ALI Council Chair (Jan. 8, 2018) (on file with author)
(describing basic concerns with draft RLLI); Letter from Laura Foggan to David F. Levi,
ALI President and Roberta Cooper Ramo, ALI Council Chair (Apr. 27, 2017) (on file with
author) (stating that there remain many important sections of the Proposed Final Draft No. 2
of the RLLI that do not reflect the law); Letter from Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison, to
RLLI Reporters regarding Chapters 1 and 2 (Sept. 18, 2015) (on file with author)
(articulating several major insurer concerns about the RLLI in Chapters 1 and 2).
42. See sources cited supra note 3; Letter from Harold Kim, ALI Member, to ALI
Council regarding “Concerns with Council Draft No. 5 of the Restatement of the Law,
Liability Insurance” (Apr. 8, 2018) (on file with author) (discussing RLLI provisions
lacking common law support); Michael Aylward, Proposed Amendment to Restatement of
the Law, Liability Insurance (motion presented at 2018 ALI Annual Meeting) (May 17,
2018) (proposing changes to RLLI’s plain meaning rule in § 3); Joanne M. Locke, Motion
to Recommit to Amend Provision Referencing “Mandatory Rules” (presented at 2017 ALI
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were joined by other stakeholders external to the ALI, including insurer
trade associations and several current and former heads of state insurance
departments.43 In spite of such objections, the ALI membership approved
most of the RLLI’s first three chapters at the organization’s 2016 Annual
Meeting.44 A vote to approve the RLLI’s fourth and final chapter, and
complete the entire project, was scheduled to take place at the 2017 Annual
Meeting, but in another unprecedented decision, the ALI leadership
postponed the vote on the eve of the meeting.45 No express reason was
given, although the decision likely stemmed from the continuing
controversy surrounding the alleged aspirational nature of many of the
project’s recommended “black letter” insurance law rules and comments.46
For example, the general counsel of twenty-seven major corporations,
many of whom stood to benefit from the RLLI’s proposed rules in their
capacity as policyholders, submitted a joint letter to the ALI leadership
stating that they shared fundamental concerns that the project did not

Annual Meeting) (May 23, 2017) (stating that RLLI’s references to “mandatory rules”
represents a new insurance law concept that lacks common law support); Vanita Banks, The
Restatement Draft Should Not Change the Well-Established Majority Rule that an Insurance
Policy Is Interpreted According to Its Plain Meaning, and if a Policy Term Is Unambiguous,
Extrinsic Evidence Is Not Admissible (motion presented at 2017 ALI Annual Meeting)
(May 23, 2017) (arguing that the RLLI’s proposed departure from the well-settled plain
meaning rule will result in uncertainty and increased litigation).
43. See Letter from Dean L. Cameron, Dir. of Idaho Dep’t of Ins., to Richard Revesz,
Dir. (Apr. 5, 2017) (on file with author) (requesting delay of vote to approve project to
allow “state regulators the opportunity to weigh in on important issues raised by the
proposed Restatement”); Letter from Patrick M. McPharlin, Dir. of Mich. Dep’t of Ins. &
Fin. Servs. (May 15, 2017) (on file with author) (stating concerns that the proposed RLLI
could significantly alter the environment in which insurance contracts are interpreted in a
way that would create instability for insurers and higher prices for consumers); Letter from
Jennifer Hammer, Dir. of Ill. Dep’t of Ins., to Director Richard Revesz (May 19, 2017) (on
file with author) (requesting that a decision to finalize the RLLI be postponed in order to
allow time for further research to be conducted); see also Eric J. Dinallo & Keith J. Slattery,
ALI’s Restatement of the Law Liability Insurance: Synopsis of Regulatory Considerations,
NAT’L ASS’N MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.namic.org/pdf/insbriefs
/ali_synopsis.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY8W-2EHR] (expressing basic concerns with the
RLLI).
44. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS., at ix (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft
No. 3, Sept. 12, 2016) (stating that all but a few sections of Chapters 1, 2, and 3 were
approved by the membership at the 2016 ALI Annual Meeting).
45. See Letter from Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison, to David F. Levi, ALI
President, and Roberta Cooper Ramo, ALI Council Chair (Apr. 27, 2017) (on file with
author) (summarizing major project concerns and urging deferral of project vote of
approval).
46. See supra notes 34–45 and accompanying text (discussing persistent concerns about
novel provisions throughout the RLLI’s development).
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faithfully “restate” liability insurance law.47
After another year of consideration, in which some significant changes
to the project (discussed below) were made, the ALI membership voted to
approve the final part of the RLLI and complete the project at the
organization’s 2018 Annual Meeting.48 Final approval of the project was
similarly controversial, as various ALI members and stakeholders
highlighted provisions they believed did not comport with existing law.49
In the aftermath of the RLLI’s membership approval, the ALI decided to
reexamine the scholarship of the project’s Reporters’ Notes before
publishing the work product in an effort to ensure the case law cited stood
for the propositions asserted. This exercise and subsequent editing resulted
in the final publication of the RLLI in the summer of 2019, more than a
year after the project’s approval by the ALI membership.50
The final published version of the RLLI contains fifty sections of
recommended common law liability insurance rules that span four chapters.
Chapter 1, titled “Basic Liability Insurance Contract Rules,” covers the
topics of: 1) Interpretation; 2) Waiver and Estoppel; and 3)
Misrepresentation. Chapter 2, titled “Management of Potentially Insured
Liability Claims,” covers the topics of: 1) Defense; 2) Settlement; and 3)
Cooperation. Chapter 3, titled “General Principles Regarding the Risks
Insured,” covers the topics of: 1) Coverage; 2) Conditions; and 3)
Application of Limits, Retentions, and Deductibles. Finally, Chapter 4,
titled “Enforceability and Remedies,” covers the topics of: 1)
Enforceability, as it pertains to implied-in-law terms, liabilities involving
aggravated fault, and known liabilities; and 2) Remedies, as it pertains to a
breach of an insurance agreement and possible bad faith.

47. Letter from 27 General Counsel to David F. Levi, ALI President (Dec. 1, 2017); see
also sources cited supra note 3 (expressing concerns regarding the RLLI).
48. See Press Release, Am. Law Inst., The American Law Institute Approves
Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance (May 22, 2018), https://www.ali.org/news/articl
es/american-law-institute-approves-liability-insurance
[https://perma.cc/6LMA-Z9XY]
(expressing the ALI’s approval of the RLLI); see also Jeff Sistrunk, Top Insurance
Legislation & Regulation Stories of 2018, LAW360 (Dec. 13, 2018) (listing the ALI’s
approval of the RLLI among the most significant insurance-related events of 2018).
49. See sources cited supra notes 3, 4, 40–41 (stating the concerns among several
parties regarding the RLLI).
50. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (recommending
common law liability insurance rules for courts to adopt).
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B. Process Successes (and Near Misses)
The RLLI’s unique history culminated in a work product in which
insurers are clearly dissatisfied, as evidenced by many project submissions
over the better part of a decade and subsequent state legislative efforts to
prevent judicial adoption of the entire RLLI.51 Do insurers have legitimate
reasons for this reaction or is their opposition sour grapes because the RLLI
did not incorporate rules they preferred? To help answer that question, it is
useful to examine some of the key battlegrounds where members of the
insurer community opposed RLLI provisions and successfully convinced
the ALI to make a course correction through the organization’s internal
processes. Stated another way, what provisions might have been included
in the RLLI if members of the insurer community opted not to engage with
the ALI?
Many of the insurer criticisms with the RLLI were expressed in
written submissions by the project’s insurer liaison, a non-member of the
ALI who took over this role around a year after the original liaison to the
prior Principles project withdrew over concern of unfair treatment and
project bias against insurers.52 Significantly, the numerous, research-driven
submissions by the insurer liaison to the RLLI Reporters during the
project’s final four years did not focus on debating which existing common
law rules the RLLI adopted; they focused primarily on alleged novel rule
formulations.53 Below are several prominent examples.
1.

Plain Meaning Rule

A basic rule of insurance contract interpretation is that unambiguous
policy terms are interpreted according to their “plain meaning.”54 This rule
51. See Letter from Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison, to David F. Levi, ALI
President, and Roberta Cooper Ramo, ALI Council Chair (Jan. 8, 2018) (on file with author)
(including multi-volume appendix with more than 1,200 pages of materials submitted
throughout the RLLI’s development).
52. See Letter from Stephen Zielezienski, AIA Insurer Liaison, to Lance Liebman, ALI
Dir., regarding “American Insurance Association’s Liaison to the ALI’s Principles of the
Law of Liability Insurance Project” (Jan. 31, 2014) (withdrawing AIA insurer liaison); see
also sources cited supra note 41 (stating insurer liaison concerns regarding the RLLI).
53. See supra note 51.
54. See STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 21:1 (3d ed. 2010) (describing the
analytical steps courts take in ascertaining the meaning of terms and conditions in an
insurance policy and stating that a court will first determine whether the terms at issue are
defined in the policy or have a meaning that is plain on its face); see also Aylward & Banks,
supra note 12 (arguing that the RLLI’s approach to the “plain meaning” rule will lead to
legal disputes).
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has long been applied throughout the United States to preclude the
introduction of evidence extrinsic to the insurance agreement of other
proposed interpretations of a policy term where that term’s meaning is
already clear “on its face.”55 The “plain meaning” rule thus promotes
predictability and consistency in the interpretation of insurance agreements,
and serves to avoid costly and unwarranted disputes.56
The RLLI recommended a new approach to the traditional plain
meaning rule called the “plain-meaning presumption.”57 Under this
approach, a policyholder58 would be permitted to introduce extrinsic
evidence of a policy term’s “plain meaning,” and overcome a presumption
against allowing consideration of extrinsic evidence, whenever the
“extrinsic evidence shows that a reasonable person in the policyholder’s
position would give the term a different meaning.”59 The proposed “black
letter” liability insurance law rule additionally stated that the different plain
meaning proffered needed to be “more reasonable” in light of the extrinsic
evidence, and needed to be “a meaning to which the language of the term is
reasonably susceptible.”60
Insurers, among others, objected to the proposed rule on the basis it
did not reflect the law of any state.61 The RLLI’s comments supporting the
rule argued that variations in how strictly courts apply the plain meaning
rule meant there was no “majority” rule, although conceded that “there are
more jurisdictions with some version of the plain-meaning rule than there
are jurisdictions that openly embrace a contextual approach” that permits a
broader introduction of extrinsic evidence.62 The Reporters’ Notes stated
55. STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 54.
56. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (“The
plain-meaning approach promotes consistency of interpretation of insurance policies . . . .”);
see also J. Walker, Jr., Judicial Tendencies in Statutory Construction: Differing Views on
the Role of the Judge, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203, 238 (2001) (stating that the plain
meaning rule encourages both judicial restraint and predictability in interpretation).
57. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 3 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft,
Mar. 28, 2017).
58. The term “policyholder” is used throughout this article to refer to a person or entity
who has obtained liability insurance or may be covered under a liability insurance policy.
The term “insured” may be the legally correct term in certain contexts, but policyholder is
used in an effort to aid the reader in readily distinguishing the two principal parties to an
insurance agreement.
59. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 3(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft,
Mar. 28, 2017) (endorsing “plain meaning presumption” in proposed final draft of the
RLLI).
60. Id.
61. See sources cited supra notes 41–42 (expressing several parties’ concerns regarding
the RLLI).
62. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final
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that the proposed rule represented “a middle point” between two “sharply
differentiated interpretive camps,” but did not expressly characterize the
rule as an innovation in law or note that such a rule had not been adopted
by any court.63
In addition to the novelty of the RLLI’s proposed “Presumption in
Favor of the Plain Meaning,” insurers, ALI members, and others with
insurance law expertise pointed out the unsound public policy of a “plain
meaning” rule that essentially allowed for multiple plain meanings of a
policy term.64 Such an approach, they argued, was counterintuitive and
threatened to allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence in almost any
case, eviscerating the predictability and consistency that the plain meaning
rule is designed to provide.65
The battle over this basic insurance policy interpretation provision in
Chapter 1 waged for years.66 It was not until April 2018, only a month
before the ALI membership’s final approval of the RLLI at the
organization’s 2018 Annual Meeting, that a draft removing this proposed
rule and replacing it with a comparatively straightforward formulation of
the plain meaning rule was unveiled to the membership.67 The project
Reporters made this major last-minute change at the behest of the ALI
Council, which had previously approved the novel plain-meaning
presumption rule but appeared to reverse course based on the strong
criticisms the proposed rule generated.68 If left included in the RLLI, this
novel and untested approach could have turned the analysis of a policy
Draft, Mar. 28, 2017) (discussing court treatment of plain meaning rule governing insurance
agreements).
63. Id. at Reporters’ Note a.
64. See sources cited supra notes 41–42 (expressing the concerns of several parties’
regarding the RLLI); Letter from Harold Kim, ALI Member, to ALI Council regarding
“Fundamental Concerns with Council Draft No. 4 of the Restatement of the Law, Liability
Insurance” (Jan. 5, 2018), at 2 (on file with author) (stating that § 3 “appears predicated on
the assumption that there may be multiple ‘plain meanings’ of a policy term when the plain
meaning rule exists to refer to the plain meaning of a policy term”); Letter from Alan
Rutkin, ALI Member, to RLLI Reporters (Jan. 2, 2018) (on file with author) (criticizing the
RLLI’s rejection of the plain meaning rule); Letter from Jackson & Campbell, P.C. to RLLI
Reporters regarding § 3 (Sept. 6, 2017) (expressing concern regarding the way in which the
RLLI addresses the concept of latent ambiguity).
65. Id.
66. See Michael F. Aylward, Should the American Law Institute Restate or Rewrite the
Rules of Interpreting Insurance Policies?, FOR DEF., Sept. 2017, at 22, 23–29 (discussing
the history of the debate over the interpretation of § 3).
67. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 3 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
No. 2, Apr. 13, 2018).
68. See id. at Reporters’ Memorandum, xxi (stating the plaining meaning rule in § 3 “is
one of the four most significant revisions” compared to the first Proposed Final Draft).
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term’s “plain meaning” on its head and created a new basis for litigation
over countless policy provisions.69
2.

Misrepresentation Doctrine

The RLLI’s initial treatment of the topic of misrepresentation in
Chapter 1 similarly created a potential to upend existing liability insurance
doctrine. Misrepresentation refers to the situation where a policyholder
makes an incorrect statement of fact on his or her insurance policy
application or renewal agreement.70 Under the common law, an insurer is
generally permitted to void or rescind an insurance agreement ab initio, or
“from the beginning,” when a policyholder has supplied false information
and that information is material to the insurance agreement.71 For example,
if a policy application for health insurance asked whether the applicant was
a smoker and the applicant, an occasional smoker, either negligently or
intentionally answered he was not, the insurer would have a basis to rescind
the policy for that misrepresentation.72
69. Letter from Harold Kim, ALI Member, to ALI Council, supra note 64; Aylward,
supra note 66; Aylward & Banks, supra note 12; see also Schwartz & Appel, supra note 14
(stating that earlier version of the RLLI “adopts a novel, litigation-enhancing approach to
the traditional rule that insurance policy terms are interpreted according to their ‘plain
meaning’”).
70. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 7 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft, Apr.
30, 2015); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159–173 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see
also Schwartz & Appel, supra note 30, at 460–65 (discussing novel approach to
misrepresentation doctrine in earlier version of the RLLI).
71. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 7 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft,
Apr. 30, 2015) (“[I]f a policy is rescinded, it is as if the policy had never been written; the
policy does not provide coverage for any claims. . . . If the insurer rescinds the policy, it
must return all premiums collected from the policyholder for that policy.”); see also JonesSmith v. Safeway Ins. Co., 174 So. 3d 240, 241 (Miss. 2015) (“For more than one hundred
and thirty years, this Court has held that an insurance company may void a policy when the
insured made material misrepresentations during the application process.”); see also Rutgers
Cas. Ins. Co. v. LaCroix, 946 A.2d 1027, 1030 (N.J. 2008) (“We hold that the . . . material
misrepresentation entitled the insurer to rescission of the insurance contract . . . .”).
Numerous state statutes also permit rescission based on any material misrepresentation by a
policyholder. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-7 (2018); see also Alfa Life Ins. Corp. v. Lewis,
910 So. 2d 757, 762 (Ala. 2005) (“Under § 27-14-7, it is not necessary that the insured have
made the misrepresentation with an intent to deceive; even if innocently made, an incorrect
statement that is material to the risk assumed by the insurer or that would have caused the
insurer in good faith not to issue the policy in the manner that it did provides a basis for the
insurer to avoid the policy.”).
72. The same rationale applies to other types of insurance policies. See, e.g., Foster v.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 703 N.E.2d 657, 658 (Ind. 1998) (“We hold, as we have before, that
an insurance company may void coverage based on a material misrepresentation in the
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The RLLI’s initial approach, which was carried over from the prior
Principles project, recommended limiting an insurer’s rescission remedy
only to situations where the policyholder’s misrepresentation was
committed intentionally or recklessly.73 Therefore, if a policyholder was
negligent in providing information to apply for or renew a policy, the
insurer would not be able to rescind the agreement and instead “must pay
the claim” of the negligent policyholder.74 In the prior Principles project,
the RLLI Reporters proposed a “quasi-reformation” remedy in this
situation whereby the insurance contract would be reformed so the insurer
paying the negligent policyholder’s claim could recoup some higher
premium for the increased risk it would have undertaken had the
policyholder supplied the correct information when asked.75 If the insurer
would not have issued a policy at all had the policyholder provided the
correct information, the insurer would then be entitled to some “reasonable
additional premium for the increased risk” after paying the negligent
policyholder’s claim.76 The RLLI never expressly addressed what the
proposed remedy would be in the case of a policyholder’s negligent
misrepresentation.
In addition to limiting rescission to only intentional or reckless
misrepresentations, the RLLI placed further limits on the application of this
remedy. It defined an intentional misrepresentation as a statement in which
the policyholder knew or believed to be false at the time it was made,
placing a difficult practical burden on an insurer to prove a policyholder’s
subjective intent when making the misrepresentation.77 The project defined
a reckless misrepresentation as one in which the policyholder was
“willfully indifferent to whether the statement is true or false,” placing a
similar burden on an insurer to establish the policyholder’s subjective

[property insurance] application.”); see also Van Horn v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 195,
200 (Md. 1994) (recognizing insurer’s common law right to void ab initio an insurance
policy, but holding that this right was abrogated in the context of auto insurance by the
state’s compulsory motor vehicle insurance law); see also Webb v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 493 N.W.2d 808, 813 (Iowa 1992) (allowing insurer to rescind policy based on material
misrepresentation in homeowners’ policy application).
73. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 7 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 1,
Mar. 2, 2015); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 7 (Tentative Draft No. 1 (revised), Jan.
4, 2014).
74. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 11 (Tentative Draft No. 1 (revised), Jan. 4,
2014).
75. Id. § 11 cmt. a; see also id. § 7 cmt. b (stating that the misrepresentation rule in § 7
and “associated quasi-reformation remedy [in § 11] are incremental law reforms”).
76. Id. § 11(2).
77. Id. § 8(1).
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mindset.78
Each aspect of this recommended approach to misrepresentation
doctrine threatened to impair the ability of insurers to void an agreement in
which a policyholder misrepresented material information. The project
Reporters acknowledged that this approach was an “innovation.”79 They
modified subsequent versions of the RLLI to remove the “quasireformation” remedy because, as stakeholders observed, it plainly had no
legal support.80 The Reporters ultimately set forth an approach more in line
with the existing common law rule entitling insurers to rescind a policy
based on any policyholder material misrepresentation.81 They continued,
however, to express dissatisfaction with existing common law in the
RLLI’s comments, citing “strong fairness and efficiency objections” to the
rule adopted (perhaps begrudgingly) in the RLLI.82
3.

Breach of the Duty to Defend

Another major topic of insurance law that generated strong opposition
before significant changes were made to the RLLI involved the
consequences of an insurer’s breach of the duty to defend its policyholder.83
In many liability insurance agreements, insurers promise to provide the
policyholder with a defense in any litigation arising under the policy,
regardless of the legal merits of a particular claim against the
policyholder.84 Chapter 2 of the RLLI recommends a number of “black
letter” rules regarding an insurer’s duty to defend, including the effect of an
insurer’s breach of this duty.85 The RLLI’s initial approach recommended
that an insurer that breached the duty to defend would: 1) lose the right to
78. Id. § 8.
79. Id. § 7 cmt. b (“The rule limiting rescission and claim denial to intentional and
reckless misrepresentations is an innovation.”).
80. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 30, at 460–65 (discussing evolution of the
RLLI’s approach to misrepresentation doctrine).
81. Id.; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. §§ 7–9 (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
82. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 7 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2019); see also
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 7 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft, Apr. 30,
2015) (expressing view of the “harshness” and “unfairness” of the traditional common law
misrepresentation rule and stating “there is not yet sufficient common-law authority” to
adopt a different approach).
83. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 19 (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (addressing
consequences of the breach of the duty to defend).
84. See id. §§ 13–14 (discussing conditions in which an insurer must defend a claim
and the insurer’s basic obligations in providing a defense).
85. See id. §§ 13–23 (addressing various topics implicating the management of
potentially insured liability claims and the duty to defend).
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control the defense or settlement of the claim; 2) lose the right to contest
coverage for the claim––in essence, a complete forfeiture rule where the
insurer must pay the claim asserted; and 3) be responsible for damages,
including the amount of any judgement against or settlement entered by the
policyholder, subject to the policy’s limits, reasonable defense costs
incurred by the policyholder, and any other damages recoverable for the
breach of a liability insurance contract.86
This rule was challenged as too extreme and one-sided against
insurers because it would strip an insurer of any ability to challenge the
lack of coverage for a claim, effectively holding the insurer strictly liable
for what might be a very minor or technical breach of the duty to defend.87
The draconian nature of the rule also threatened to significantly increase
insurance costs and potentially create unsound incentives for policyholders
to manufacture breach claims.88 The RLLI Reporters defended this
“forfeiture-of-coverage-defense” rule, stating it “discourages insurers from
attempting to convert a duty-to-defend policy into an after-the-fact defensecost-reimbursement policy.”89 They acknowledged the rule “may increase
the cost of liability insurance,” but felt an increase would be justified “by
increasing the certainty that insurers will defend [insureds] from liability
claims.”90 Insurers countered that the rule presented a solution in search of
a problem, noting a lack of any evidence suggesting insurers systematically
disregard the duty to defend.91
The RLLI Reporters subsequently proposed a novel limited forfeiture
rule as a “middle ground” approach.92 Under this rule, an insurer that
86. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 19 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft,
Apr. 30, 2015).
87. See Letter from Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison, to RLLI Reporters regarding
Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance (Sept. 18, 2015) (stating § 19 “creates a
problem of disproportionate outcomes, by lacking any nexus between the ‘remedy’ of losing
the right to contest coverage and the actual harm demonstrated, if any”).
88. Id.; Letter from Victor E. Schwartz and Christopher E. Appel to RLLI Reporters
regarding “Concerns about Scope of Insurer Duty to Defend (§ 13) Based on New Language
in Council Draft No. 1” (Sept. 25, 2015) (discussing how “errant policyholders” could abuse
§ 13 to manufacture breach claims, “which pursuant to § 19 could implicate the forfeiture of
all coverage defenses”).
89. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 19 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Discussion
Draft, Apr. 30, 2015).
90. Id.
91. See Letter from Laura Foggan, supra note 87 (“Section 19 seems to be based on the
erroneous premise that an insurer may intentionally seek to escape its defense obligations
rather than fulfill them. That faulty premise of a universal bad actor cannot justify a
forfeiture rule.”).
92. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 19 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft
No. 1, Apr. 11, 2016).
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breached the duty to defend “without a reasonable basis” was required to
provide coverage for the legal action for which the policyholder sought a
defense.93 Insurers and others objected to this “black letter” rule on a
familiar basis: the proposed rule was an innovation of the RLLI Reporters
and had not been adopted by any court.94
In spite of the rule’s novelty and insurers’ objections, the rule was
included in the project’s initial Proposed Final Draft scheduled for a vote of
approval by the ALI membership at the organization’s 2017 Annual
Meeting (a vote that, as discussed previously, was postponed on the eve of
the Annual Meeting).95 The limited forfeiture rule was ultimately
jettisoned in the months leading up to the 2018 Annual Meeting, where the
project obtained final approval, as part of the same group of ALI Council
requested changes that included the major revision to the RLLI’s plain
meaning rule.96 The amended rule addressing the consequences of a breach
of the duty to defend in the RLLI’s final publication tracks the majority
common law rule in which a breaching insurer loses its right to assert any
control over the defense or settlement of the action, but can still assert
coverage defenses.97 Had the novel limited forfeiture rule remained in the
RLLI, it could have significantly increased insurers’ liability and costs
where adopted by courts by creating new incentives for policyholders to
sue over the alleged “reasonableness” of an insurer’s conduct in providing
an agreed upon defense.
4.

Prejudice Requirement to Enforce Policy Conditions

The treatment of policy conditions in a liability insurance agreement
became another area where the RLLI proposed major innovations in the
law that were ultimately rejected. A policy condition refers to an event that
either must occur, or must not occur, before performance under the policy

93. Id. § 19(2).
94. Letter from Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison, to RLLI Reporters regarding § 19
(Feb. 26, 2016); see also Letter from Judge Sarah S. Vance to RLLI Reporters regarding §
19 (Oct. 26, 2015), at 2 (stating that the RLLI “does not adequately support the proffered
rationale for adopting the draft’s ‘limited-forfeiture rule’”).
95. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 19 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft,
Mar. 28, 2017).
96. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § xxiv (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final
Draft No. 2, Apr. 13, 2018) (detailing how some of the language of the limited forfeiture
rule in § 19 addressing the consequences of the breach of the duty to defend was
incorporated into the RLLI’s discussion of insurer “bad faith” in § 50).
97. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 19 (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
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becomes due.98 Most insurance policies contain numerous conditions that
articulate the parties’ responsibilities, such as a policyholder’s duty to
notify the insurer of a claim and cooperate with the insurer and the
insurer’s obligation in various situations in which coverage under the
policy may be implicated.99 For example, if a policyholder was sued and
consented to a settlement of the claim before notifying his or her insurer of
the lawsuit, an insurer would not be required to provide coverage where a
policy condition expressly required timely notice of the suit. Ordinarily, a
party need only show that the policy condition was, or was not, satisfied to
enforce it.100
Chapter 3 of the RLLI, which includes the topic of “Conditions,”101
proposed adding a new requirement that an insurer must show it suffered
“substantial prejudice” to enforce any policy condition under the
policyholder’s control.102 This novel approach sought to extend case law
requiring an insurer to demonstrate prejudice to enforce a narrow set of
policy conditions, namely 1) a notice-of-claim condition, 2) a voluntary
payments condition, and 3) a cooperation condition.103 No court, however,
has adopted a blanket rule with respect to the enforcement of all conditions
under a policyholder’s control that the policyholder failed to satisfy.104
98. Id. § 34.
99. See id. § 34 cmt. a (stating that “almost all insurance policy provisions would be
understood to contain conditions”).
100. See LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 196:2 (3d ed.
2012) (“[B]reach of a true condition precedent bars recovery without regard to prejudice.”).
101. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. §§ 34–36 (AM. LAW INST. 2019)
(providing a general discussion of policy conditions (§ 34), a specific discussion of notice
and reporting conditions (§ 35), and a discussion of assignment of rights under a liability
insurance policy (§ 36)).
102. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 35(3) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft
No. 2, Oct. 9, 2015).
103. See id. § 35 cmt. c-h; Letter from Kim V. Marrkand to RLLI Reporters regarding §§
34–35 (Jan. 20, 2016), at 4 (stating that § 35’s proposed universal prejudice requirement “is
without precedent”) (on file with author); Letter from Victor E. Schwartz and Christopher E.
Appel to RLLI Reporters regarding “Treatment of Conditions in Chapter 3 of the
Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance” (Dec. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Treatment of
Conditions in Chapter 3 Letter] (discussing various concerns with RLLI provisions on
enforcement of policy conditions) (on file with author).
104. See sources cited supra note 103. Woznicki v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 115 A.3d 152,
171 (Md. 2015) (“The prejudice rules apply where an insurer disclaims coverage as a result
of the insured’s noncompliance with a condition contained in the insurance policy requiring
notice or cooperation.”) (emphasis added); RTE Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 247 N.W.2d 171,
179 (Wis. 1976) (“This court has consistently treated the rule established in the [noticeprejudice] statute as an exception to the general rule [that insurers need not show prejudice
to bar coverage] and has refused to extend the exception beyond its terms.”). Examples of
conditions under the control of a policyholder include medical examination provisions,
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The proposed “substantial prejudice” requirement also marked the
most extreme standard applied by courts recognizing an insurer prejudice
rule in the narrow, aforementioned set of policy conditions.105 Most states
either apply an ordinary prejudice standard or do not require a showing of
prejudice at all with respect to these specific policy conditions.106 Hence,
the RLLI recommended turning an exception to the general enforcement
rule for policy conditions, whereby courts have imposed an insurer
prejudice requirement in only a few distinct situations, into the new
“general rule,” and recommended adopting the most burdensome minority
standard for insurers to satisfy this new rule.107
Over time, the RLLI Reporters jettisoned this novel approach, first
downgrading the “substantial prejudice” standard to an ordinary prejudice
standard and later modifying the universal prejudice rule to apply only to
conditions governing a policyholder’s notice of a claim and cooperation.108
As with other aspirational proposals discussed, the inclusion of this rule in
the final RLLI could have profoundly impacted insurers’ ability to enforce
the terms of an insurance policy. Such a rule would have created new
exhaustion provisions, and insurance maintenance provisions, see Custer Med. Ctr. v.
United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1098 (Fla. 2010), McArthur v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 274 P.3d 981, 989 (Utah 2012), and Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 770 A.2d 403, 418 (R.I. 2001), respectively, among others.
105. See Treatment of Conditions in Chapter 3 Letter, supra note 103, at 3–5 (noting that
few jurisdictions adopt a “substantial prejudice” requirement beyond the notice context).
106. See Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Greytak, 350 P.3d 63, 66 (Mont. 2015) (“A majority of the
states have adopted the notice-prejudice rule in insurance coverage disputes, requiring that
the insurer demonstrate that it was materially prejudiced by not having received prompt
notice or notice as soon as practicable of an event that could trigger coverage.”); Prince
George’s Co. v. Local Gov’t Ins. Tr., 879 A.2d 81, 93–94 (Md. 2005) (recognizing notice
prejudice rule as majority approach); but see Midwest Emp’rs Cas. Co. v. E. Ala. Health
Care, 695 So. 2d 1169, 1172 (Ala. 1997) (“[A] primary insurer need not demonstrate
prejudice in order to use untimely notice as a bar to coverage”); DeFrain v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 817 N.W.2d 504, 506 (Mich. 2012) (“We hold that an unambiguous noticeof-claim provision . . . is enforceable without a showing that the failure to comply with the
provision prejudiced the insurer.”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Scott, 372 S.E.2d 383,
385 (Va. 1983) (“When a violation of the notice requirement is substantial and material, the
insurer is not required to show that it has been prejudiced by the violation.”).
107. See Treatment of Conditions in Chapter 3 Letter, supra note 103, at 3–5
(“[S]ubstantial prejudice is the most extreme approach, and appears to be a minority
approach . . . .”).
108. Compare RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 35(3) (AM. LAW INST.,
Preliminary Draft No. 2, Oct. 9, 2015) (incorporating “substantial prejudice” rule), and
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 35(3) (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 2, Dec.
28, 2015) (maintaining general prejudice rule) with RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. §
35(3) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 11, 2016) (eliminating general prejudice
rule).
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incentives for policyholders to flout or ignore policy conditions under their
control if they were aware that their insurer would, as a practical matter,
need to show substantial prejudice in every circumstance just to enforce
contract terms. Insurance costs would also likely increase to account for
insurers needing both to develop evidence establishing substantial
prejudice (or even ordinary prejudice) to safeguard their ability to enforce
policy conditions, as well as to provide coverage in those situations where a
policy condition clearly excluded coverage but substantial prejudice could
not be shown.
5.

Other Significant Changes

In addition to the novel liability-enhancing RLLI rules discussed,
which were created by the Reporters yet defeated within the ALI, a handful
of other proposed rules with at least some support in the common law were
rejected. These rules are noteworthy not because they stray explicitly from
the ALI’s instruction to “restate” existing law, but rather because they paint
a more complete picture of what the RLLI was on the verge of becoming if
the Reporters were left to their own devices. A proposed collection of
minority approaches to key liability insurance issues promised to expand
dramatically the potential liability of insurers.
a.

One-Way Attorney Fee Shifting

For years, the RLLI recommended one-way attorney fee shifting as a
generally available common law remedy in liability insurance disputes.109
Several “black letter” rules proposed to depart from the “bedrock” common
law “American Rule” that each party is responsible for his or her own
attorney’s fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.110 The RLLI
Reporters proposed one-way attorney fee shifting in the specific context of
liability insurance even though attorney fee shifting is not intrinsically an
insurance issue; rather, it is a significant public policy issue that has been
debated for decades, perhaps most notably by Congress and state
legislatures.111
109. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. §§ 47(4), 48(3), 50(1) (AM. LAW INST.,
Council Draft No. 4, Dec. 4, 2017); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. §§ 49(3), 50(3),
52(1) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 3, Sept. 12, 2016).
110. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (quoting Hardt
v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010)).
111. See Letter from Victor E. Schwartz and Christopher E. Appel to RLLI Reporters
regarding “Chapter 4’s Derogation of the ‘American Rule’ to Permit One-Way Attorney Fee
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The ALI had never before endorsed attorney fee shifting in a
Restatement, let alone one-sided fee shifting in which a prevailing
policyholder could recover his or her attorney’s fees but a successful
insurer could not.112 Although a minority of states have adopted exceptions
to the American Rule as a matter of common law,113 the ALI Council
resolved not to go down the path of recommending broad attorney fee
shifting for most types of liability insurance disputes. The RLLI’s
proposed “black letter” rules endorsing one-way attorney fee shifting
against an insurer for a prevailing party in a declaratory judgment action
and any action for breach of the policy agreement were removed just a few
months before the 2018 ALI Annual Meeting where the RLLI received
final approval.114 The RLLI retained fee shifting in the context of insurance
bad faith.115
b.

Liabilities Involving Aggregated Fault

The final version of the RLLI includes a section addressing insurance
of liabilities involving “aggregated fault.”116 This section refers to
insurance policies that provide coverage for legal actions such as a criminal
prosecution or an action seeking fines, penalties, or punitive damages
related to alleged intentional harm.117 Whether a jurisdiction permits
insurance coverage for liabilities involving aggregated fault is a public
policy determination typically made by a legislature, or regulatory body
acting pursuant to legislative authority, not a common law court.118 The
RLLI, however, proposed a “black letter” rule broadly endorsing judicial

Shifting” (Nov. 7, 2016) (examining the RLLI’s treatment of one-way attorney fee shifting)
(on file with author).
112. See Letter from Harold Kim, ALI Member, to ALI Council regarding “Fundamental
Concerns with Council Draft No. 4 of the Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance” (Jan.
5, 2018), at 4 (on file with author) (stating that the RLLI’s fee shifting proposal is an “illadvised departure from prevailing common law”).
113. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 47 Reporters’ Note c (AM. LAW INST.
2019) (citing cases that have allowed attorney fee shifting in certain situations).
114. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. at xxiii (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final
Draft No. 2, Apr. 13, 2018) (stating that attorney fee shifting “is one of the four most
significant revisions” compared to the first Proposed Final Draft).
115. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 50(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2019); see also
infra Part II.0.
116. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 45 (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
117. Id.
118. See id. § 45 cmt. a (adopting broad definition of “legislation” that includes statutes,
constitutions, local ordinances, and administrative regulations).
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recognition of insurance coverage for conduct involving aggregated fault.119
The proposed rule was met with backlash both for its alleged intrusion
upon legislative authority and conflict with existing statutes and court
decisions.120 For instance, the RLLI noted that courts “in nearly half the
states have held that liability insurance for directly assessed punitive
damages contravenes the public policy of the state.”121 The RLLI’s rule
was eventually changed to be agnostic on this issue, stating that “[e]xcept
as barred by legislation or judicially declared public policy” the insurability
of liabilities involving aggregated fault should be enforceable.122
c.

Punitive Damages Standard for Bad Faith

Similar concerns about the RLLI overstepping into legislative policy
setting arose when the Reporters recommended a punitive damages
standard for courts to adopt in insurance bad faith cases.123 This proposed
“black letter” rule stated that punitive damages could be awarded where the
“insurer intentionally, maliciously, knowingly, wantonly, or with reckless
disregard of its obligations engaged in a course of outrageous or repeated
conduct that disregarded the rights of the insured.”124 By setting a “reckless
disregard” minimum conduct standard for awarding punitive damages, the
rule endorsed a minority approach permitting awards of punitive damages
where an insurer had no intent to harm the economic interests of a
policyholder.125
119. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 34 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No.
2, Dec. 28, 2015) (stating “[i]t is not against public policy for a liability insurance policy to
cover defense costs incurred in connection with any claim . . . involving aggravated fault,”
and “[i]t is not against public policy for a liability insurer to pay damages to a third-party
claimant for the civil liability of the insured for intentionally caused harm, punitive
damages, fraud, criminal acts, or other conduct involving aggravated fault.”).
120. See Letter from Kim V. Marrkand to RLLI Reporters regarding §§ 34–35 (Jan. 20,
2016), at 2–3 (on file with author) (stating that § 34’s proposed rule “runs squarely against
established law in numerous jurisdictions” and “does away with the public policy
determination of state legislatures and courts that have concluded that insurance coverage
for punitive damages is against public policy”).
121. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 34 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft
No. 1, Apr. 11, 2016).
122. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 45 (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
123. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 53 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft
No. 3, Sept. 12, 2016).
124. Id.
125. See Letter from Victor E. Schwartz and Christopher E. Appel to RLLI Reporters
regarding “Punitive Damages Standard in § 53 of the Restatement of the Law of Liability
Insurance” (Oct. 28, 2016) (on file with author) (examining the RLLI’s standard for
awarding punitive damages for insurance bad faith and surveying case law).
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The Reporters put forth this common law rule despite conceding that
“almost every state requires proof of greater wrongdoing than that required
for a finding of bad faith” to award punitive damages, and that in “many if
not most states there is a statute that provides the legal standard for
awarding punitive damages.”126 The comments supporting the proposed
RLLI rule contained no acknowledgement of the fact the rule had relatively
little common law support, or that it conflicted with the law in numerous
jurisdictions that do not allow punitive damages at all for a bad faith breach
of an insurance contract.127 Thus, on balance, this proposed RLLI rule
represented a permissive minority rule on the extreme end of the spectrum
of punitive damage standards. Although this rule––and entire section––
was later scrapped, it provides another powerful example of a proposed
RLLI “black letter” rule poised to dramatically expand insurers’ liability.
II.

CONTROVERSIAL PROVISIONS IN THE PUBLISHED
RESTATEMENT

The final version of the RLLI retains a number of provisions that
insurers, ALI members, and other stakeholders challenged as novel
departures in liability insurance law.128 As mentioned previously, the
published RLLI consists of fifty sections setting forth recommended
common law liability insurance rules. Most of these sections have
generated some level of concern with respect to either the recommended
“black letter” rules or the comments elaborating how the rules may be
applied.129 Hence, in spite of key positive changes (discussed in the

126. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 53 cmt. c, Reporters’ Notes c (AM. LAW
INST., Preliminary Draft No. 3, Sept. 12, 2016).
127. See supra note 125. Jurisdictions that do not allow punitive damages for bad faith
breach of an insurance contract include: Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Tennessee, Virginia and Washington, and the District of Columbia. See Heil Co. v.
Evanston Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 722, 728 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Tennessee law); Stull v.
First Am. Title Ins. Co., 745 A.2d 975, 981 (Me. 2000); Casey v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 729
N.W.2d 277, 286 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006), review denied, 731 N.W.2d 746 (Mich. 2007);
Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb. 1975); Jarvis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
448 A.2d 407, 410 (N.H. 1982); Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 299 S.E.2d 514, 518 (Va. 1983);
Fisher Prop., Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 726 P.2d 8, 23 (Wash. 1986); see also N.H. Rev.
Stat. § 507:16 (“No punitive damages shall be awarded in any action, unless otherwise
provided by statute.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105 (2008) (establishing the exclusive
remedy for an insurer’s bad faith and not permitting punitive damages).
128. See sources cited supra note 3 (expressing concerns over the ramifications of the
RLLI departing from established liability insurance law).
129. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 3, 40–42 (discussing the RLLI’s departure from
established liability insurance law).
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previous section) made during the RLLI’s development process, the final
work product did not end the controversy surrounding it.
This section examines ten RLLI topics that generated significant
controversy during the project’s development. The objective of this
analysis is twofold. First, the analysis seeks to identify RLLI rule
formulations that are novel or otherwise inconsistent with the four
“principal elements” of a Restatement because such a determination would
validate (or at least give some credibility to) claims that the project
proposes to reshape rather than restate existing law.130 Second, the analysis
looks at the effect of proposed novel rules, as well as provisions with very
limited common law support, with respect to the claim that the RLLI lacks
balance and exhibits an overall bias against insurers.
1.

Misrepresentation Revisited

The RLLI’s final approach regarding misrepresentation doctrine
provides a helpful starting point in evaluating the project’s contours. As
discussed in Part I, the RLLI initially proposed an entirely new approach to
misrepresentation that limited an insurer’s rescission remedy to intentional
or reckless policyholder misrepresentations, requiring the insurer to pay the
claims of policyholders who negligently misrepresented information.131
The project further proposed a “quasi reformation” remedy in which the
insurer that paid the negligent policyholder’s claim could recover some
amount of additional increased premium to account for the increased risk
had the policyholder provided the correct information when asked.132
While these novel provisions were ultimately removed from the RLLI,
what took their place also incorporates some novel elements.
Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the RLLI address the topic of misrepresentation.
Section 7 sets forth the longstanding common law rule permitting an
insurer to rescind a policy based on a misrepresentation.133 The application
of the rule, however, is subject to a determination that the policyholder’s
misrepresentation was both “material” (section 8) and that the insurer
“reasonably relied” on the misrepresentation in issuing or renewing the
policy (section 9).134 Materiality under the RLLI requires a showing that “a
reasonable insurer in this insurer’s position would not have issued the
130. See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text (describing the Restatement
development process).
131. Supra Part I.B.2.
132. Id.
133. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
134. Id. §§ 8–9.

744

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 22:3

policy or would have issued the policy only under substantially different
terms.”135
Significantly, this “substantiality” requirement, whereby an insurer
must demonstrate that it would have only issued a policy under
“substantially different terms” as opposed to simply “different terms,” does
not appear as a standard in the case law.136 A comment supporting the
RLLI’s materiality rule glosses over this fact, acknowledging that “courts
have not often used this precise expression” while arguing the approach
“best gives effect” to the purpose of the materiality requirement.137 The
Reporters’ Notes supporting the approach similarly concede that “[m]ost
courts have not used the phrase ‘substantially different policy terms.’”138
Only two cases are cited as “support” for the requirement, neither of which
establishes a liability insurance rule that an insurer can demonstrate
materiality only if it would have issued the policy under “substantially
different terms.”139 Rather, both cases relied upon involve the application
of Connecticut law and quote the same Connecticut Supreme Court case
from 1929 that happens to include the term “substantially” in discussing
when a fact may be material.140
The distinction between “substantially different terms” and “different
terms” may appear minor or even “nitpicky,” but the change is novel to
misrepresentation doctrine. If adopted by courts, it could significantly limit
insurers’ common law rescission remedy. It could require insurers to
devote significant resources, for example by having to hire experts, to
prove just how different their underwriting processes might have been had
a policyholder not lied to them or otherwise acted unreasonably in

135. Id. § 8 (emphasis added).
136. Id. § 8 cmt. e (noting the dearth of case law employing the precise expression
“substantially different terms”); see also Letter from Kim V. Marrkand to RLLI Reporters
regarding § 8 (June 14, 2017) (on file with author) (stating that “well-settled and
longstanding law does not impose a ‘substantiality’ requirement in determining whether a
material misrepresentation by an insured may result in the denial of a claim or rescission of
a policy”).
137. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 8 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
138. Id. § 8 Reporters’ Note e.
139. See id. Reporters’ Note e cites Pinette v. Assur. Co. of Am., 52 F.3d 407, 411 (2d
Cir. 1995), and Principal Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Coassin, 884 F.3d 130, 135–36 (2d Cir.
2018), as support for the “substantiality” requirement. Both cases apply Connecticut law
and quote the same sentence in Davis Scofield Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co., 145 A. 38, 40 (Conn.
1929), that a fact is material to the consideration of an insurance contract “when, in the
judgment of reasonably careful and intelligent persons, it would so increase the degree or
character of the risk of the insurance as to substantially influence its issuance, or
substantially affect the rate of premium.”
140. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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providing the information the insurer used to price a policy.
The separate reliance element for an insurer to rescind a policy based
on a misrepresentation also incorporates this substantiality language.141
Reliance under the RLLI requires a showing that “the insurer would not
have issued the policy or would have issued the policy only with
substantially different terms” and that this action would have been
reasonable under the circumstances.142 Here, no case or other source is
cited in the RLLI as support for the inclusion of the substantiality
requirement as it relates to an insurer’s detrimental reliance. The
Comments and Reporters’ Notes to section 9 discuss various aspects of
requiring an insurer to show reliance to prevail on a misrepresentation
claim, which is an approach followed in some states, but omit discussion of
the case law basis of the proposed “black letter” rule language.143 The
result is a novel rule formulation for an insurer to demonstrate reasonable
reliance, which, similar to the materiality requirement, would limit an
insurer’s rescission remedy for misrepresentation if adopted by courts.
2.

Liability of Insurer for Conduct of Defense

The RLLI’s treatment of the relationship between an insurer and an
attorney it hires to defend a policyholder has garnered some of the
strongest criticisms of any recommended “black letter” liability insurance
rule.144 This is because section 12 of the RLLI, which addresses an
insurer’s potential liability for the negligent acts or omissions of counsel
hired to defend a policyholder, does not “restate” the law of any
jurisdiction.145 Section 12 sets forth two novel bases for an insurer to be
141. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 9(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
142. Id. § 9(1)–(2).
143. Id. § 9 cmt. c-f, Reporters’ Note a, d.
144. See, e.g., Brackett Denniston & Harold Kim, Proposed Amendment to Section
12(1) of Restatement of the Law Liability Insurance Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (motion
presented at 2018 ALI Annual Meeting) (May 18, 2018) (on file with author) (proposing
deletion of section 12(1), “which creates a rule which no court or legislature has adopted
imposing liability on insurers for the independent negligence of defense counsel they
selected to defend their insureds”); Letter from DRI – The Voice of the Defense Bar to
RLLI Reporters (May 18, 2018) (on file with author) (arguing Section 12(1) “has no place
in a Restatement”); Letter from Illinois Association of Defense Trial Council to RLLI
Reporters (May 15, 2018) (on file with author) (“Section 12 offers a solution for a problem
that does not exist.”); Letter from Kim V. Marrkand to RLLI Reporters regarding § 12, at 1
(Dec. 28, 2017) (on file with author) (stating that the section 12 approach “continues to
ignore the essential nature of legal practice as established in existing law and to misconstrue
the nature of the tripartite relationship among insurers, defense counsel and insureds”).
145. See sources cited supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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subject to liability for the negligence of the counsel it hires: 1) where the
insurer fails to take reasonable care in selecting counsel to defend a legal
action; and 2) where the insurer directs the conduct of the counsel in a
manner that “overrides the duty of the counsel to exercise independent
professional judgment.”146
With regard to the first liability theory, the RLLI proposes that courts
recognize a duty “that turns on the insurer’s efforts to assure that the lawyer
has adequate skill and experience in relation to the claim in question.”147
The rule appears to envision a new policing function on the part of insurers,
separate from the state bar associations that exercise oversight over the
practice of law in a jurisdiction.148 Under this approach, an insurer’s failure
to adequately screen for signs of job impairment, for example missed court
appearances or unreliability due to an attorney’s substance abuse, would
give rise to direct liability for any negligent acts or omissions by the
attorney within the scope of that risk.149 What other signs of inadequate
attorney skill or experience that might fall within this proposed insurer
oversight role is left unanswered.
The RLLI also explicitly references an insurer’s selection of an
attorney with “inadequate professional liability insurance” as another
potential basis for triggering direct liability for the selected attorney’s
negligence.150 A comment supporting section 12 suggests “a court could
find that an insurer’s decision to select defense counsel who does not have
adequate liability insurance constitutes a form of negligent selection” under
the RLLI’s proposed rule, but that the RLLI “takes no position on this
issue, because no court has yet addressed it.”151 In addition, the RLLI, after
identifying this potential application and leaving the issue open, provides
little insight on what might constitute “adequate” malpractice insurance.152
A Reporters’ Note opines that the question should be decided by a trier of

146. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
147. Id. § 12 cmt. b.
148. Id.
149. Id. § 12 cmt. b ill. 1–3. The illustrations provided in earlier RLLI drafts each
related to attorney substance abuse issues. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 12
cmt. b ill. 1–3 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Apr. 13, 2018). The final RLLI
expressly recognizes that the “subsequent revision of the Illustrations to remove the
references to substance abuse does not represent a judgment by the Institute regarding the
implications of retaining an impaired attorney to represent an insured.” RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 12 Reporters’ Note b (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
150. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 12 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 12 cmt. c, Reporters’ Note c (AM. LAW
INST. 2019).
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fact;153 an approach that could create a potential jury question over the
adequacy of a selected attorney’s professional liability insurance in any
case an attorney is alleged to have committed malpractice, so that liability
for negligence might be shifted to the insurer. The Reporters’ Note further
envisions a determination by a jury or other trier of fact of whether the
insurer owes a “continuing duty to monitor that adequate coverage remains
in force throughout the term of the defense counsel’s representation.”154
The RLLI cites no case law adopting such open-ended liability rules.
The comments supporting section 12 also include no direct
acknowledgment of the rule’s novelty, and may incorrectly suggest to
readers that the rule enjoys clear common law support.155 Buried in section
12’s Reporters’ Notes, though, is the acknowledgement that “there are no
judicial decisions that have held an insurer liable in tort for negligent
selection of counsel.”156 Nevertheless, the Reporters argue that “some
courts have suggested the possibility of such a cause of action” and that
other considerations support the RLLI’s proposed approach.157 Notably,
the few cases relied upon for this inferential proposition each expressly
reject finding an insurer liable for the negligence of counsel it retains.158
The result is that the RLLI obscures the basic fact that no jurisdiction
follows the common law liability rule proposed in section 12.
The second liability theory, in which an insurer may be deemed
negligent for overriding the independent judgment of its hired counsel,159 is
153. See id. § 12 Reporters’ Note c (stating that “what constitutes adequate liability
insurance coverage is a question of fact” that turns on several factors).
154. Id.
155. See id. § 12 cmt. a, b (stating affirmatively that “[w]hen a defense counsel selected
by an insurer to represent an insured commits professional malpractice, the insured may
recover from that attorney for any harm that results”). Section 12 Reporters’ Note b, for
instance, begins the explanation of the negligent selection rule by stating, “As a general
matter in the law of torts, an actor who hires an independent contractor to perform the
original actor’s duty may be held liable for negligently selecting the independent contractor,
when the negligent selection causes harm.” Id. § 12 Reporters’ Note b.
156. Id. § 12 Reporters’ Note b.
157. Id. Section 12 Reporters’ Note b cites the following two cases as supporting the
“possibility of such a cause of action”: Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 369 S.E.2d
367, 372 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) and Evans v. Steinberg, 699 P.2d 797, 799 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985). Two Kansas cases are also cited as a “see also,” namely, Hackman v. W. Agric. Ins.
Co., 275 P.3d 73, at *16–17 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (unpublished disposition) and Progressive
N.W. Ins. Co. v. Gant, No. 15-9267-JAR-KGG, 2016 WL 4430669, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 22,
2016).
158. Id.
159. See id. § 12(2) (“An insurer is subject to liability . . . when the insurer directs the
conduct of the counsel with respect to the negligent act or omission in a manner that
overrides the duty of the counsel to exercise independent professional judgment.”).
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likewise novel. This rule appears predicated on “general principles of
agency and tort law”;160 however, a Reporters’ Note supporting this
provision concedes “no cases were found holding a liability insurer liable
for the torts of counsel on a theory of apparent authority or negligent
supervision.”161 Nevertheless, the Reporters surmise “this dearth of cases
likely has to do with the special professional obligations owed by attorneys
to their clients.”162 They argue that because attorneys hired by insurers to
represent policyholders “are not understood to be agents of the insurers”
under courts’ current thinking, “vicarious, apparent-authority, and
negligent-supervision liability claims would not make sense.”163 They
theorize that if “an insurer were to take steps to override the normal
professional independence of defense counsel, this prevailing presumption
against vicarious and direct liability of the insurer would be overcome” and
the rule of section 12 would be justified.164
Regardless of the veracity of any part of this rationale, it is pure
conjecture. And it is being used to prop up a rule in a Restatement of Law
that no jurisdiction has adopted as a matter of common law. Both of the
novel liability theories put forth in section 12’s “black letter” rule also
plainly disadvantage insurers by proposing unprecedented expansions of
their liability.
3.

Conditions Under Which the Insurer Must Defend

Section 13 of the RLLI sets forth the circumstances in which an
insurer issuing a policy that includes a duty to defend must defend its
policyholder in any legal action that may implicate coverage under the
policy.165 The section adopts a version of the so-called “complaintallegation rule” whereby the insurer “must take as true all the facts alleged
in the complaint or comparable document that favor coverage” and an
accompanying defense.166 Significantly, the proposed rule does not define
a “comparable document,” which creates ambiguity with respect to what
other documents would trigger an insurer’s obligation to provide a
defense.167 This rule formulation could, if adopted by courts, result in a

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. § 12 cmt. d.
Id. § 12 Reporters’ Note d.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 13.
Id. § 13 cmt. a.
Id. § 13(2)(a).
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broader and less clear set of circumstances in which an insurer must
provide a defense.168
Section 13 also requires an insurer to provide a defense whenever any
other allegation, not contained in the complaint or comparable document, is
“known to the insurer” and a “reasonable insurer” would regard the
allegation as one triggering the duty to defend.169 Here, similar ambiguity
exists as to the potential broad scope of this requirement regarding facts
outside of the complaint that an insurer becomes aware of. A number of
courts, though, have recognized that an insurer’s knowledge of facts
“beyond the complaint” can trigger the duty to defend, so the provision is
not novel in spite of questions regarding its uncertain scope and
application.170
The main controversy in section 13 relates to the situation in which an
insurer learns of facts that demonstrate it owes no duty to defend its
policyholder.171 These are facts not at issue in the legal action for which
coverage is sought that leave “no genuine dispute” that coverage does not
exist under a policy, for instance because the defendant seeking a defense is
not an insured under the policy at issue or because the property (e.g. car)
involved is not the property covered under the policy at issue.172 Section
13 adopts a “black letter” rule limiting the factual circumstances in which
an insurer may properly deny a defense to five specific situations or where
the applicable jurisdiction recognizes a “similar, narrowly defined

168. See Memorandum from RLLI Insurer Liaison Laura Foggan to RLLI Reporters
regarding § 13 of Proposed Final Draft (July 19, 2017) (on file with author) (urging
revisions to § 13 standard because “case law support is lacking for a standard requiring the
insurer to defend based on facts external to the complaint that the insurer ‘should have
known’ or that a ‘reasonable insurer’ would take into account”).
169. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 13(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2019); see also
Memorandum from Insurer Liaison Laura Foggan to RLLI Reporters regarding § 13(2)(b)
of Proposed Final Draft (Apr. 25, 2017) (on file with author) (stating that § 13(2)(b)
“suggests a rule that an insurer would be required to defend based on unalleged matters”
which “is not the law”).
170. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS., § 13 Reporters’ Note b; but see William T.
Barker, The Draft Restatement Improperly Limits Use of Extrinsic Evidence in Insurer
Decision-Making on Duty to Defend, ALI (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.ali.org/media/ filer_p
ublic/26/10/2610e5c9-b133-4dc9-a75c-5a8cc3afd01f/barker-william-extrinsic-eviden ce.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HLN-H7L2] (examining version of RLLI § 13).
171. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 13(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2019); see also
William T. Barker, An Insurer Need Not Defend if Undisputed Facts Not at Issue or
Potentially at Issue in the Underlying Action Establish as a Matter of Law that the Legal
Action Is Not Covered (motion presented at 2017 ALI Annual Meeting) (proposing
amendment to § 13(3) with respect to when an insurer need not provide a defense).
172. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS., § 13(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
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exception” to the complaint-allegation rule.173 This enumerated list of
exceptions to the general rule requiring an insurer to provide a defense
includes the two situations mentioned previously in which the defendant is
not an insured under the policy or where the policy does not cover a
“vehicle or other property involved in the accident,” as well as the
situations in which the policy has been cancelled or a claim was reported
late under a “claims-made-and-reported” policy or is subject to a relatedclaim or similar policy exclusion.174
Outside of these narrow
circumstances, the insurer is required under the RLLI’s rule to provide a
defense even if undisputed facts known to the parties demonstrate that
coverage is not available under the policy and the insurer owes no duty to
defend.
Each of the five situations permitting the insurer to deny a defense is
supported in case law.175 What is novel about section 13’s approach is that
no court has held that these five situations constitute an exhaustive list of
the universe of circumstances in which facts not genuinely in dispute
permit an insurer to deny a defense.176 Earlier versions of the RLLI
recommended a rule of general applicability in which coverage questions
implicating the duty to defend would be determined based on “all of the
facts and circumstances reasonably available to the insurer,” but this
approach was replaced with an exclusive list of exceptions.177 Insurers and
173. Id. § 13(3)(f).
174. Id. A claims-made-and-reported policy refers to an insurance policy in which a
claim must be both made against the insured and reported to the insurer during the policy
period for coverage to apply. Infra Part II.0.
175. See Memorandum from RLLI Insurer Liaison Laura Foggan to RLLI Reporters
regarding § 13(3) (Aug. 17, 2017) (on file with author) (stating there is no case law
anywhere limiting an insurer’s ability to deny a defense to the enumerated situations in §
13(3)); Letter from RLLI Insurer Liaison Laura Foggan to RLLI Reporters regarding § 13
(July 11, 2016) (on file with author) (recommending “at a minimum for the Restatement to
recognize explicitly that the [§ 13(3)] examples are not exhaustive”); Letter from Victor E.
Schwartz and Christopher E. Appel to RLLI Reporters regarding “Support for Revising
Scope of Insurer Duty to Defend (§ 13) in Council Draft No. 1” (Oct. 1, 2015) (on file with
author) (discussing related case law).
176. See Memorandum from RLLI Insurer Liaison Laura Foggan to RLLI Reporters
regarding § 13(3) (Aug. 17, 2017) (on file with author) (discussing different approaches in
the case law and lack of affirmative limitation to the five situations proposed in the RLLI);
see also Letter from Victor E. Schwartz and Christopher E. Appel to RLLI Reporters
regarding “Concerns About Scope of Insurer Duty to Defend (§ 13) Based on New
Language in Council Draft No. 1” (Sept. 25, 2015), at 1 (on file with author) (stating that
proposed approach in § 13(3) would “represent a major departure in insurance law, and one
that is not supported by existing case law”).
177. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 13 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft, Apr.
30, 2015).
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others challenged the list as overly restrictive and novel in its
formulation,178 but a return to an “all-the-facts-and-circumstances
approach” was rejected on the grounds it would “go well beyond” the
enumerated exceptions and create too much uncertainty for
policyholders.179
The RLLI’s final approach of narrowly limiting the conditions in
which an insurer may deny a defense based on facts not in dispute has the
effect of increasing an insurer’s costs and potential liability. Under the
rule, an insurer that clearly owes no duty to defend its policyholder may
nevertheless be required to defend the policyholder, at least until a later
stage when the insurer is permitted to terminate its defense. The
policyholder, meanwhile, obtains a windfall defense. The rule formulation,
therefore, is another with novel aspects that disadvantage insurers.
4.

Terminating the Duty to Defend a Legal Action

Similar concerns regarding the RLLI’s inclusion of a specific list of
circumstances (as opposed to a less rigid general rule) in which an insurer
may deny a duty to defend at the onset of a legal action exist with respect
to an insurer’s ability to later terminate that defense. Section 18 of the
RLLI provides that an insurer may only terminate its duty to defend upon
the occurrence of one or more of eight enumerated events.180 These events
include: 1) an explicit waiver by the policyholder of the right to a defense;
2) final adjudication of the action; 3) final adjudication or dismissal of the
parts of the action that eliminate a basis for coverage and the duty to
defend; 4) settlement of the action; 5) partial settlement of the action that
eliminates any basis for coverage; 6) exhaustion of the applicable policy
limits (if so stated in the policy); 7) a correct determination by the insurer
that it does not owe a duty to defend pursuant to the rules in section 13; and
8) final adjudication that the insurer does not have a duty to defend the
action.181
178. See sources cited supra notes 175-176 (showing instances of parties objecting to
the approach proposed in § 13(3)); Letter from Michael F. Aylward to RLLI Reporters
regarding Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance Tentative Draft No. 3: Section 13(3)
Duty to Defend (Sept. 29, 2016) (on file with author) (recommending the RLLI “stick with
the language” providing a general rule as opposed to enumerated exceptions); Letter from
Anastasia Nye to RLLI Reporters regarding § 13 (Sept. 6, 2016) (on file with author)
(cautioning that “efforts to categorize or list instances where non-liability facts are properly
considered in determining the defense obligation will not capture all instances”).
179. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 13 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
180. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
181. Id.
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The comments supporting this rule explain that it envisions broad
“judicial supervision” over insurer withdrawals of a defense.182 The RLLI
states that the approach is justified based on the importance of the insurer’s
duty to defend and the harm that can occur if an insurer prematurely
withdrawals from a defense.183 By singling out liability insurance contracts
for broad judicial supervision, however, the RLLI seeks to impose a new
and unique oversight structure that does not exist with respect to any other
type of contract between two private parties.184 Indeed, no court has
expressly articulated an exclusive list of circumstances that enable an
insurer to lawfully terminate its defense or has expressly indicated that an
insurer needs to seek court permission before acting pursuant to terms in a
private contract.185
Section 18’s clear effect, if adopted by courts, would be to limit
insurers’ ability to terminate a defense. This approach would, in turn,
increase insurers’ costs associated with providing a defense that may not be
warranted in the first place and costs associated with obtaining a partial or
final adjudication or settlement, or similar form of judicial approval.186 It
would also increase insurers’ potential liability exposure for breach of the
duty to defend if an insurer withdrew a defense in any manner not
specifically enumerated in section 18 or otherwise permitted under the
narrow circumstances set forth in section 13 where an insurer may deny a
defense based on facts not in dispute in the legal action. All of these results
operate to the detriment of insurers.
5.

Insurer Recoupment of the Costs of Defense

An issue tied to the RLLI’s recommended limitations on an insurer’s
ability to either initially deny a defense (section 13) or subsequently
182. Id. § 18 cmt. a.
183. Id.
184. See Letter from RLLI Insurer Liaison Laura Foggan to RLLI Reporters regarding
§§ 13, 18 (Sept. 16, 2015) (on file with author) (stating that approach in § 18
“fundamentally alters the terms of insurance contracts and contradicts black letter law”).
185. The Reporters’ Notes accompanying § 18 cite cases that discuss in general terms
circumstances in which an insurer may terminate a defense, but do not contain citations to
any case setting forth an exhaustive list of circumstances, one or more of which must exist,
for an insurer to terminate a defense, which is the approach taken in § 18. RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 18 Reporters’ Notes a-j (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
186. See Letter from Kim V. Marrkand to RLLI Reporters regarding § 18 (Aug. 4,
2017), at 5 (on file with author) (expressing view that “§18 should be deleted in its entirety
because it simply goes way too far, contravenes what a Restatement should do and is
contrary to the well-developed jurisprudence on the duty to defend,” and, at a minimum,
amended to avoid “unnecessary, time-consuming and costly litigation”).
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withdraw a defense (section 18) is whether the insurer can recoup its costs
in providing a defense when the insurer had no obligation to do so. Section
21 of the RLLI addresses an insurer’s potential recoupment of defense
costs and sets forth a “black letter” rule rejecting any common law right of
recoupment by an insurer.187 Accordingly, any defense costs incurred by an
insurer must be absorbed by the insurer unless the applicable policy states
otherwise.
This “no-recoupment” default rule has case law support, but is a
minority approach.188 One of section 21’s comments acknowledges the
“majority position” of an insurer’s right to recoupment of defense costs,
often based on a theory of unjust enrichment, yet proceeds to characterize
the section’s no-recoupment rule as a “position embraced by . . . recent
state-court decisions” as part of an emerging common law trend.189 The
comment then undercuts this characterization, conceding that “a slightly
greater number of state courts have espoused contrary views” and that a
“majority of federal courts making Erie predictions also have adopted
positions contrary to the rule stated in this Section.”190 Regardless of the
description used, though, a minority of courts follow a no-recoupment rule
and it is clearly appropriate for a Restatement to adopt.
What makes the rule controversial––other than the fact it adds to the
growing set of RLLI provisions that favor policyholders and increase
insurers’ costs––is the fact that it contradicts another ALI Restatement,
namely the Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
(R3RUE).191 This Restatement, which was completed in 2011, includes a
lengthy discussion of restitution in the context of insurance.192 It sets forth
several rules and illustrations that recognize an insurer’s ability to
successfully bring a claim to recover defense costs associated with a legal
action in which the insurer owed no duty to defend.193
The RLLI devotes significant ink to reconciling this conflict between

187. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 21 (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
188. See id. § 21 Reporters’ Note a (“In case law and commentary, the position adopted
in this Section typically has been referred to as the minority position.”).
189. Id. § 21 cmt. a. The version of the RLLI that received final approval at the 2018
ALI Annual Meeting described this minority rule as the “emerging state-court majority
rule.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 21 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Revised Proposed
Final Draft No. 2, Sept. 7, 2018).
190. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 21 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 35 (AM. LAW
INST. 2011).
192. Id. § 35 cmt. c.
193. Id.
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section 21’s no-recoupment rule and the R3RUE.194 The RLLI states that
the R3RUE “expresses a general view with respect to recoupment that
differs from the special case of the default rule” of section 21 because the
R3RUE treats liability insurance defense costs purely as “rendering an
extra-contractual performance” and fails to take “full account” of “special
considerations of insurance law.”195 These special considerations, the RLLI
argues, include benefits an insurer obtains from providing a defense when
it “believes in good faith (and in fact correctly) that the underlying action is
not covered, in view of the risk of enhanced liability that could attend an
adverse decision on coverage.”196 The RLLI contends that an insurer’s
ability to exercise control over the cost, quality, and direction of a defense,
and participate in settlement discussions for a claim it bears no obligation
still constitute benefits that belie a recovery under a theory of unjust
enrichment as set forth in the R3RUE.197
This argument to try to reconcile these two Restatements might best
be described as a “stretch.” The RLLI’s adoption of a different rule
directly at odds with both the R3RUE and the case law trend allowing
recoupment also suggests the approach fails to satisfy the ALI’s guideline
that a Restatement chooses the rule that “leads to more coherence” in the
law.198 In any event, the soundness of the RLLI’s approach is less
important than the symbolism of the no-recoupment rule’s inclusion.
Adopting a minority approach that plainly favors policyholders and
proposes to increase insurers’ costs, even at the expense of contravening
the approach taken in another recent Restatement, appears to feed into the
narrative that the project demonstrates a bias against insurers. Although
there is certainly no restriction in the ALI’s rules governing Restatements
against either adopting a minority approach or overriding another recent
Restatement, the decision to proceed this way could be perceived as
inviting greater controversy in a project already saturated with it.

194. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 21 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2019). The
version of the RLLI that received final approval at the 2018 ALI Annual Meeting conceded
only that an “apparent conflict” existed between § 21’s no-recoupment rule and the
approach taken in the R3RUE. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 21 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST., Revised Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Sept. 7, 2018). It argued that the R3RUE started
from a different assumption about insurance law that “disappear[ed] once insurance law is
understood to include a no-recoupment default rule,” which offered a puzzling and
apparently self-fulfilling explanation. Id.
195. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 21 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. ALI STYLE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 5.
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Insurer Duty to Make Reasonable Settlement Decisions

One of the most consequential topics of the RLLI involves an
insurer’s duty to act responsibly in pursuing settlement of a policyholder’s
claim.199 Case law often refers shorthand to an insurer’s “duty to settle,”
but the RLLI recognizes that insurers do not have a duty to settle every
claim.200 Rather, an insurer’s duty is to “make reasonable settlement
decisions” where a potential exists for a judgment in excess of the
applicable policy limits, and the policyholder could be responsible for
paying that excess amount.201
Section 24 of the RLLI states that a reasonable settlement decision
would be one made by a reasonable insurer that bears sole responsibility
for the full amount of the potential judgement.202 This decision includes the
responsibility for insurers to make a policy’s limits available for settlement
of a claim that exceeds those limits if a reasonable insurer would do so in
the circumstances.203 The duty set forth in the RLLI also requires an
insurer “to accept a settlement offer that a reasonable insurer would accept
and to make an offer to settle when a reasonable insurer would do so.”204
An insurer that breaches this duty is subject to liability for “any
foreseeable harm caused by the breach, including the full amount of
damages assessed against the insured in the underlying legal action,
without regard to the policy limits.”205 Consequently, an insurer that fails
to accept a reasonable settlement offer, for instance in a good faith effort to
negotiate a lower settlement on behalf of its policyholder, “bears the risk of
an excess judgment against the insured at trial.”206 The main controversy
with the RLLI’s approach is that it expressly recommends subjecting an
insurer to broad extra-contractual liability in the absence of any alleged
“bad faith” on the insurer’s part.207
199. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (explaining
the link between an insurer’s duty to make reasonable settlement decisions and the
application of general contract law duties of good faith and fair dealing within the insurance
policy context).
200. Id. § 24 cmt. b.
201. Id. § 24(1).
202. See id. § 24(2); see also id. § 24 cmt. c (explaining standard as a “disregard the
limits” rule or requiring insurer’s “equal consideration” to the interests of its insured).
203. Id. § 24(3).
204. Id. § 24 cmt. d.
205. Id. § 27(1).
206. Id. § 24 cmt. d.
207. See, e.g., Letter from Kim V. Marrkand to RLLI Reporters regarding §§ 24 and 27,
at 1–2 (Dec. 27, 2017) (on file with author) (“The core of the problem is that Section 24,
despite the clear language of the Black Letter Law speaking to the ‘duty to make reasonable
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As a comment supporting section 24 states, “courts in many
jurisdictions refer to the standard for breach of the duty to make reasonable
settlement decisions as one of ‘bad faith.’”208 The RLLI, in comparison,
eschews any reference to bad faith to describe the insurer’s breach of the
duty to make reasonable settlement decisions. Instead, the RLLI adopts a
“commercial-reasonableness standard” that it asserts “most courts actually
apply” in practice, “even those that invoke the language of bad faith.”209
The RLLI’s approach, therefore, merges negligence and bad faith standards
and jurisprudence such that in any breach-of-settlement duty case “the
ultimate test of liability is whether the insurer’s conduct was reasonable
under the circumstances.”210
By recommending a negligence standard for an insurer’s breach of the
duty to make reasonable settlement decisions, the RLLI proposes to
dramatically expand the scope of liability against insurers in the United
States.211 The approach removes any need for evidence showing an
insurer’s intentional or reckless misconduct or other impure motive, such as
the insurer purposefully placing its interests above its policyholder. All
that is required to subject an insurer to liability for an excess judgment is a
determination by a jury or trier of fact, with the benefit of hindsight, that a
“reasonable insurer” would have accepted a settlement offer.212 This
approach permits liability even where an insurer acted in good faith at all
times with respect to the interests of its policyholder.
The RLLI’s approach also proposes to expand liability in situations in
which an insurer never receives a settlement demand.213 It adopts an
ambiguous requirement subjecting an insurer to extra-contractual liability
where the insurer does not make a settlement offer in the absence of a
settlement demand, or opts not to make a counteroffer, where a jury or trier
of fact determines––again, with the benefit of hindsight––that a reasonable
insurer would have done so.214 Although a comment to section 24

settlement decisions,’ would nevertheless impose liability upon an insurer who has in fact
acted reasonably in evaluating a settlement offer.”); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 30, at
465–71 (discussing concerns with RLLI approach permitting liability where an “insurer
acted perfectly reasonably” in negotiating a settlement).
208. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 24 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 3, 41, 207 stating concerns with RLLI approach in § 24).
212. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 24 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
213. See id. § 24 cmt. f (stating that, absent a reasonable offer by the plaintiff, it may be
unreasonable for an insurer to not make a settlement offer before trial).
214. See id. (adopting a reasonableness standard regarding the insurer’s obligation to
make settlement offers or counteroffers).
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recognizes that “it may be strategically useful, from the perspective of a
reasonable insurer that bears full risk of judgment, to refrain from making a
settlement offer” in various situations, the rule effectively turns every
insurer’s good faith decision not to make an offer or counteroffer into a
potential jury question.215
The RLLI’s allowance of extra-contractual liability where an insurer
acts in good faith may be a questionable approach from a public policy
perspective,216 and yet another in the project designed to expand insurers’
liability, but it is not unprecedented.217 A number of courts adopt a
negligence standard in breach-of-settlement duty cases and additionally
recognize that an insurer may need to initiate settlement efforts to satisfy its
duty.218 Nevertheless, the RLLI’s discussion of this approach, which
endeavors in part to reclassify many bad faith cases as negligence cases,
may overstate the actual support for the precise rule among courts. At the
very least, the RLLI provides an unclear analysis of where the law stands
and which jurisdictions have in their bad faith jurisprudence dispensed with
any need to show some form of insurer misconduct that at least
demonstrates an absence of good faith before subjecting an insurer to
potentially massive extra-contractual liability.
In addition, it is important to recognize that the RLLI’s approach,
similar to other provisions discussed, recommends the most permissive
standard recognized by courts for bringing a claim against an insurer for
breach of its settlement obligations. The clear import of the rule, if adopted
by courts, would be to dilute existing standards in bad faith litigation and
expand liability against insurers.219
7.

Damages for Breach of the Duty to Make Reasonable Settlement
Decisions

As discussed in the previous section, an insurer that breaches the
RLLI’s duty to make reasonable settlement decisions is subject to liability
for “any foreseeable harm” caused by the breach, including the full amount
215. Id.
216. See supra note 207; see also Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, CommonSense Construction of Unfair Claims Settlement Statutes: Restoring the Good Faith in Bad
Faith, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1477, 1495–99 (2009) (expressing view that bad faith claims
should include a minimum element of intentional or reckless misconduct).
217. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 24 Reporters’ Note a, f (AM. LAW INST.
2019) (citing cases in which the insurer has an affirmative duty to explore settlement
possibilities).
218. Id.
219. See infra Part II.0.
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of any excess judgment assessed against the policyholder.220 This damages
rule, set forth in section 27, proposes to include punitive damages among
the types of “foreseeable” damages an insurer must pay where a punitive
award has been assessed against the policyholder in the underlying legal
action.221 Therefore, a policyholder who has been punished by a court for
his or her reprehensible behavior can, in bringing a successful claim for
breach of the duty to make reasonable settlement decisions, shift that entire
punishment onto the insurer.
No court has adopted such a rule.222 In fact, every court that has
considered the approach has rejected it. As a section 27 comment and
corresponding Reporters’ Note acknowledge, there have been five reported
court rulings on this issue and all five concluded that requiring insurers to
pay punitive damages levied against a policyholder with respect to a breach
of the insurer’s settlement duty would violate state law.223 In these
jurisdictions, insurance coverage for punitive damages is not permitted,224
which is a public policy judgment based on the recognition that punitive
damages are “intended to punish the defendant for his wrongful acts and to
deter similar conduct in the future.”225
220. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 27(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
221. See id. § 27 cmt. e (stating a “punitive-damages award is a foreseeable consequence
of the insurer’s breach”).
222. Id.; Victor E. Schwartz, Proposed Amendment to Restatement of the Law, Liability
Insurance Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (motion presented at 2018 ALI Annual Meeting)
(proposing to amend § 27 to remove provisions dealing with insurer liability for punitive
damages assessed against insured in underlying action); Joanne M. Locke & Phil Goldberg,
Proposed Amendment to Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance Proposed Final Draft
(motion presented at 2017 ALI Annual Meeting) (proposing to amend § 27 to remove
provisions dealing with insurer liability for punitive damages assessed against insured in
underlying action).
223. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 658 (Cal. 1999); Lira
v. Shelter Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 514, 517–18 (Colo. 1996); Soto v. State Farm Ins. Co., 635
N.E.2d 1222, 1224–25 (N.Y. 1994); see also Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 36
F.3d 1491, 1506 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that policyholder may not shift liability for
punitive damages to insurer; the duty of good faith does not include duty to settle or
contribute to settlement of a punitive damages claim, which is “uninsurable”). In the most
recent case referenced in Reporters’ Note e, Wolfe v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., the
Third Circuit held that punitive damages awarded against an insured in the underlying case
could not be considered compensable damages in an action against the insurer for bad
faith/failure to settle. “To hold otherwise would shift the burden of the punitive damages to
the insurer, in clear contradiction of Pennsylvania public policy.” Wolfe v. Allstate Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 790 F.3d 487, 493 (3d Cir. 2015).
224. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 27 Reporters’ Note e (AM. LAW INST.
2019).
225. Lira, 913 P.2d at 517 (citing Seaward Constr. Co. v. Bradley, 817 P.2d 971, 974
(Colo. 1991)) (emphasis added).
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As the California Supreme Court explained, a rule like the one
envisioned in section 27 of the RLLI would allow an insured to “shift to its
insurer, and ultimately to the public, the payment of punitive damages
awarded in the third party lawsuit against the insured as a result of the
insured’s intentional, morally blameworthy behavior against the third
party.”226 “To allow such recovery,” the court continued, “would (1)
violate the public policy against permitting liability for intentional
wrongdoing to be offset or reduced by the negligence of another; (2) defeat
the purposes of punitive damages, which are to punish and deter the
wrongdoer; and (3) violate the public policy against indemnification for
punitive damages.”227
The RLLI’s only proffered support for enabling a policyholder to shift
responsibility for a punitive damages award onto his or her insurer comes
from two dissenting opinions.228 The RLLI states that section 27 “follows
the approach of the dissenting judges” for public policy reasons such as the
encouragement of reasonable settlement decisions by insurers, even though
no court has actually adopted this public policy.229 The rule is a clear
innovation in common law doctrine, and another that would plainly provide
a windfall to policyholders while increasing the potential liability of
insurers if adopted by courts.
8.

Consequences of the Breach of the Duty to Cooperate

The RLLI’s fifty sections of “black letter” liability insurance rules
restate a single duty on the part of policyholders: the duty to cooperate.230
This duty includes the obligation for policyholders to reasonably assist in
the investigation, defense, and potential settlement of the legal action for
which coverage is sought.231 Section 30 addresses the consequences of a
policyholder’s breach of the duty to cooperate. It provides that an insurer
may be relieved of its obligations under a policy only if it demonstrates that
the policyholder’s breach of the duty to cooperate caused or will cause
prejudice to the insurer.232
As the comments supporting this rule explain, courts have taken a
226. PPG Indus., Inc., 975 P.2d at 658.
227. Id.
228. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 27 Reporters’ Note e (AM. LAW INST.
2019) (citing PPG Indus., Inc., 975 P.2d at 658–62 (Mosk, J., dissenting) and Lira, 913 P.2d
at 520–22 (Lohr, J., dissenting)).
229. Id. § 27 cmt. e.
230. See id. § 29.
231. Id.
232. See id. § 30(1).
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range of approaches with respect to the effect of a policyholder’s breach of
the duty to cooperate.233 Courts on one end of the spectrum follow a
“strict-condition rule” in which any material breach of the policyholder’s
duty to cooperate relieves the insurer of its policy obligations.234 Courts on
the other end apply a prejudice requirement in which an insurer is only
relieved of its policy obligations if it can demonstrate a “substantial
likelihood” that the policyholder’s cooperation would have affected the
outcome of the legal action, such as by allowing the insurer to win a
dismissal.235 The RLLI’s approach adopting a prejudice requirement more
closely aligns with the latter approach.236
Specifically, the RLLI endorses a “prejudice standard in the duty-tocooperate context [that] is difficult for insurers to satisfy.”237 The
comments supporting the rule expressly reject any “undemanding standard”
for prejudice to an insurer, and assert that a policyholder’s failure to
cooperate should only relieve an insurer of its policy obligations where that
failure is shown to “affect the outcome of the action.”238 The RLLI also
dismisses the notion that an increase in an insurer’s defense costs alone, for
instance cost increases brought about by a policyholder’s willful failure to
cooperate, can satisfy the recommended prejudice standard.239
Instead, an insurer harmed by what may be a policyholder’s deliberate
efforts to undermine the handling of an insurance claim and flout a
cooperation policy condition may only obtain relief if the harm raises to a
litigation outcome-changing level.
The RLLI cites as examples
policyholder misconduct that deprives the insurer of a full or partial
defense, increases the amount of a judgment in a substantial way, or
deprives the insurer of an opportunity to settle the action for a substantially
lower amount than the damages ultimately awarded.240 The consequences
of smaller offenses that nonetheless harm an insurer and violate the policy
must be absorbed by the insurer; a result that could encourage intentional
misconduct by policyholders by excusing misconduct in all except the most
233. See id. § 30 cmt. a (discussing how some jurisdictions handle a breach of the duty
to cooperate).
234. See id. (stating that a minority of jurisdictions follow a “strict-condition rule”).
235. Id. § 30 cmt. b.
236. See id. (discussing proposed prejudice standard).
237. Id. § 30 cmt. a.
238. Id. § 30 cmt. b, c.
239. See id. § 30 cmt. b (stating that to satisfy the RLLI’s prejudice standard “[i]t is not
ordinarily enough that the insured’s failure to cooperate increased the cost or difficulty of
the defense”).
240. See id. (discussing scenarios where conduct “has affected or will affect the outcome
of the action”).
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egregious circumstances.241
Although the approach in section 30 has some case law support,242 it
provides another example of the RLLI adopting a rule on the end of the
spectrum that most disadvantages insurers.243
The rule allows
policyholders to violate their one restated duty with relative impunity so
long as the misconduct cannot be said to exceed the high bar of affecting
the ultimate outcome of the action. An acknowledged result of limiting an
insurer’s ability to rely on cooperation conditions to address abusive
policyholder behavior is the potential for increased insurance costs, which
are costs the RLLI expressly contends an insurer should not be able to
recover.
9.

Notice and Reporting Conditions

The final version of the RLLI states that an insurer must demonstrate
it suffered prejudice to enforce two types of policy provisions: 1) a
provision setting forth the policyholder’s duty to cooperate with his or her
insurer (addressed in the previous section); and 2) a provision requiring the
policyholder to provide timely notice of a claim.244 As discussed in Part I,
earlier versions of the RLLI proposed a novel “universal” prejudice
requirement for an insurer to enforce any policy condition under the
policyholder’s control before landing on this case law-supported
approach.245 Section 35 of the RLLI provides that an insurer need not
demonstrate prejudice with respect to a subset of liability insurance policies
known as “claims-made-and-reported” policies that expressly condition
coverage on the policyholder reporting a claim within a specified period.246
241. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 30, at 471–76 (discussing earlier version of the
RLLI’s proposed duty to cooperate rule and its potential to encourage rather than deter
intentional misconduct by policyholders); see also Letter from Victor E. Schwartz and
Christopher E. Appel to RLLI Reporters regarding “Improving the Policyholder Duty to
Cooperate in the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance” (Apr. 10, 2015) (on file
with author) (explaining the consequences of a breach of the duty to cooperate and concerns
about the RLLI’s proposed approach).
242. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 30 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2019)
(stating that a majority of jurisdictions impose some form of prejudice requirement).
243. See supra Part II.0, 0–0 (discussing the RLLI’s approach to topics of
misrepresentation, duty to defend, recoupment, and duty to make reasonable settlement
decisions).
244. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 34(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2019)
(addressing conditions in liability insurance policies).
245. See supra Part I.B.0 (discussing the RLLI’s proposed prejudice requirement for
enforcing any policy condition under the policyholder’s control).
246. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 35(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2019)
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As the comments supporting this rule recognize, “[c]ourts generally
conclude that putting the reporting requirement in the insuring agreement
of a claims-made-and-reported policy makes that condition sufficiently
material to the contract that the ordinary notice-prejudice rule does not
apply.”247
Claims-made-and-reported policies also serve important
additional purposes beyond the traditional claims-management purpose of a
notice-of-claim condition, namely “simplifying insurers’ reserving
practices” and “reducing the amount of uncertainty in insurance pricing.”248
The comments further note that claims-made-and-reported policies
typically provide an “extended reporting period” (e.g. 60 days) after the
policy period expires for the policyholder to report claims that arose near
the end of policy period.249
The RLLI, however, goes on to adopt a “black letter” rule stating that
if a claims-made-and-reported policy does not include an extended
reporting period, courts should take it upon themselves to write a
“reasonable” extended reporting period into the policy.250 A comment
supporting this approach states that reported cases “rarely address” this
situation, but concedes that these decisions strictly enforce a claimsreporting condition without fashioning some additional “reasonable”
reporting period.251 The RLLI attempts to marginalize this case law on the
basis that the reported cases “often describe claims that are reported over a
year after the policy period ended,” leaving “few published opinions . . .
that involve claims that are reported less than three months after the end of
the policy period.”252 It speculates, without support, that “insurers wisely
choose not to press” cases involving shorter delays, suggesting the case law
supporting strict enforcement of claims-reporting conditions might be
different if insurers did.253
In any event, the RLLI proceeds to state that “recent authority”
supports the approach taken in section 35.254 This recent authority, and the
sole “source” of this RLLI rule, however, is actually a single cited case

(discussing notice and reporting conditions).
247. Id. § 35 cmt. c.
248. Id.; see also id. § 35 cmt. d, e (discussing justifications for strict enforcement of
claim-reporting condition).
249. See id. § 35 cmt. c, f (discussing claim-reporting conditions and proposed extended
reporting period).
250. Id. § 35 cmt. g.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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from a California mid-level appellate court in 2005.255 In that case, the
court also did not adopt a rule authorizing a “reasonable” extended
reporting period as set forth in section 35. The court held that a
policyholder’s reporting of a legal malpractice claim to his insurer a few
days after the policy period expired warranted “equitable excuse of the
reporting condition” where it was ambiguous as to “whether a ‘claim’ was
even made” against the policyholder during the policy period.256 The court
additionally made clear it was not adopting a “bright-line” rule allowing
equitable relief where a policy did not contain an extending reporting
period, stating “[e]quities vary with the peculiar facts of each case” and that
“most of the time––it will not be equitable to excuse the non-occurrence of
a condition.”257
The RLLI’s reliance on this single case to support a “black letter” (i.e.
bright-line) liability insurance rule appears, at best, misplaced. The rule
“restated” in section 35 can be more accurately characterized as a novel
approach that would allow a policyholder to avoid enforcement of a claimreporting period in any claims-made-and-reported policy without an
extended reporting period so long as the policyholder reported a “last
minute claim” within a “reasonable time.”258 The rule directs courts to
assess what a “reasonable time” may be and effectively rewrite the policy
language.259 Regardless of the public policy arguments for or against such
an approach, the fact remains that it is not an approach followed by courts.
It represents another aspirational RLLI rule that runs counter to case law
and would have the practical effect of increasing insurers’ potential liability
if adopted by courts.
10. Liability for Insurance Bad Faith
The RLLI addresses an insurer’s liability for bad faith in section 49,
but the topic is one that must be read in combination with earlier sections,
255. Id. § 35 cmt. g, Reporters’ Note g (citing Root v. Am. Equity Specialty Ins. Co., 30
Cal. Rptr. 3d 631, 646–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)).
256. Root, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 635, 647.
257. Id. at 647; see also World Health & Educ. Found. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 612 F.
Supp. 2d 1089, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (declining to follow Root).
258. See Letter from Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison, to David F. Levi ALI
President, and Roberta Cooper Ramo, ALI Council Chair (Jan. 8, 2018) (summarizing
concerns with draft RLLI, including § 35); Letter from Laura Foggan, RLLI Insurer Liaison,
to David F. Levi, ALI President, and Roberta Cooper Ramo, ALI Council Chair (Apr. 27,
2017) (on file with author) (stating concerns with draft RLLI).
259. See sources cited supra note 258 (expressing concerns regarding potential final
approval of the RLLI based on provisions that include § 35).
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most notably section 24 addressing an insurer’s duty to make reasonable
settlement decisions.260 As discussed, section 24 attempts to merge existing
bad faith jurisprudence with an insurer’s duty to make reasonable
settlement decisions, and impose broad extra-contractual damages pursuant
to an ordinary negligence standard.261 Indeed, the comments supporting
section 49 expressly state that an “action for breach of the duty to make
reasonable settlement decisions that is framed as a ‘bad faith’ action is not
a liability insurance bad-faith action under the rules followed in this
Restatement.”262 Under section 49, bad faith refers to situations in which
an insurer fails to perform its policy obligations without a “reasonable basis
for its conduct” and does so with the “knowledge of its obligation to
perform or in reckless disregard of whether it had an obligation to
perform.”263
On the surface, section 49’s “more demanding two-pronged standard,”
which incorporates both objective and subjective elements, might appear a
robust standard that comports with the approach followed by many
courts.264 But, when viewed in context with section 24, which proposes to
appropriate a wide swath of cases traditionally regarded as bad faith cases,
insurer bad faith under the RLLI is sapped of meaning.265 An insurer is
subject to a broad array of extra-contractual damages under the RLLI that
are comparable to bad faith damages even where the insurer’s conduct falls
well below the bad faith standard set forth in section 49. Damages for an
insurer’s unintentional breach of the duty to make reasonable settlement
decisions include liability for the full amount of any judgment awarded
against the policyholder without regard to the policy’s limits, “any
foreseeable harm”266––a broad category that, as discussed, includes
punitive damages awarded against the policyholder in the underlying
action,267 attorney fees where relevant and permitted by statute or court
260. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. §§ 24, 49 (AM. LAW INST. 2019)
(discussing duty to make reasonable settlement decisions and insurance bad faith).
261. See supra Part II.0Error! Reference source not found. (discussing the RLLI’s
approach to insurer duty to make reasonable settlement decisions).
262. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 49 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
263. Id. § 49.
264. Id. § 49 cmt. b.
265. Id. § 24 cmt. a (discussing relationship between duty to make reasonable settlement
decisions and bad faith); supra Part II.6; see also Schwartz & Appel, supra note 216, at
1497 (discussing need for bad faith standard to include minimum element of intentional or
reckless misconduct and cautioning that “[i]f bad faith comes to mean everything, then it
will soon mean nothing”).
266. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 27(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
267. See supra Part II.7 (analyzing damages for breach of the duty to make reasonable
settlement decisions).
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rule,268 and “[a]ny other loss, including incidental or consequential loss”
foreseeable by the insurer at the time of contracting.269
In comparison, an insurer that engages in intentional or reckless
misconduct that harms its policyholder––i.e. the standard set forth in
section 49––may obtain nearly the same scope of relief. Section 50 of the
RLLI states that the remedies available for insurance bad faith include
compensatory damages, including reasonable attorney fees, “any other
loss” caused by the bad faith conduct, “[o]ther remedies as justice
requires,” and punitive damages if the insurer’s conduct meets the
applicable state-law standard.270 Thus, the difference between the remedies
available under the RLLI for an insurer’s unintentional breach of the duty
to make reasonable settlement decisions and an insurer’s willful acts of bad
faith boil down to the latter tacking on recovery of attorney fees (as
opposed to merely carrying the possibility of recovery of attorney fees),
allowing some additional types of compensatory damages such as noneconomic damages, and recognizing the possibility of punitive damages
where these damages are already supported by state law.271
The result is that there is not a major difference in the RLLI in what a
policyholder may recover against his or her insurer for what may be a
major difference in both degree and kind with respect to the insurer’s
conduct. This is no accident. Sections 24 and 49 are designed to reclassify
“several categories of insurance-law cases that many courts classify
together as insurance bad-faith cases” so that the most permissive judicially
recognized standard for policyholders to satisfy (i.e. negligence) may be
applied to the broadest group of cases pursuant to section 24.272 At the
same time, the RLLI’s “demanding” bad faith standard in section 49 omits
reference to longstanding insurance bad faith standards and concepts that
require a showing of an insurer’s malice, ill-will, or evil motive to support
a bad faith claim.273
To be clear, the RLLI adopts a bad faith standard in section 49 with
case law support.274 Nevertheless, novel aspects exist in the manner in
268. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 48 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2019)
(discussing awards of attorney fees).
269. Id. § 48(4).
270. Id. § 50.
271. See id. § 50 cmt. a, d (discussing recovery of compensatory and punitive damages
for bad faith).
272. Id. § 24 cmt. a.
273. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 216, at 1495–99 (discussing development of bad
faith standards to address egregious insurer misconduct); supra note 125 (discussing
punitive damages standards pertaining to bad faith).
274. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 49 Reporters’ Note cmt. b (AM. LAW
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which the RLLI treats the topic of insurance bad faith, its restated insurer
duty to make reasonable settlement decisions, and the available remedies.
The RLLI proposes to move the law of bad faith away from the intentional,
egregious, and reprehensible behaviors that have historically provided the
lynchpin of this body of law toward a comparatively “watered down”
approach that promotes broader application and increased liability against
insurers.
III.

OVERALL ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE
RESTATEMENT

The consistency in which the RLLI recommends liability insurance
rules that would increase insurers’ liability and costs is striking. Each of
the ten topics discussed in Part II, which implicate more than ten RLLI
sections, “restate” rules that disadvantage insurers compared to prevailing
state common law, most in a manner that includes some measure of
novelty. Several of the RLLI’s proposed rules are also completely novel
and do not reflect the law of any jurisdiction in the United States. Against
that backdrop, it is fair to conclude that the RLLI is not a “pure”
Restatement of existing common law as traditionally defined by the ALI
and that the concerns expressed by insurers and others have merit.275
But, is it possible that the ten topics examined are somehow not
indicative of the entire work product, and that the RLLI’s apparent thumb
on the scale against insurers is counterbalanced by provisions that operate
to reduce insurers’ liability and costs? Might there even be novel RLLI
provisions that benefit insurers?
A review of the RLLI’s fifty sections suggests the answer to both of
these questions is “no.” In fact, only two RLLI sections addressing an
issue with a clear case law divide stand out as endorsing what might be
described as an “insurer-friendly” rule. One is section 19 addressing the
consequences of a breach of the duty to defend, an issue discussed in Part
I.276 Here, the RLLI Reporters proposed both an extreme complete
forfeiture-of-coverage defenses rule and then a novel limited forfeiture-ofcoverage defenses rule before adopting the final “prevailing legal rule” in
INST. 2019) (discussing liability standard for insurance bad faith).
275. At the very least, the novel RLLI provisions discussed in Part II contravene the
ALI’s requirement that Restatement rules be “constrained by the need to find support in
sources of law.” ALI STYLE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 6; see also supra notes 17–22 and
accompanying text (discussing the guidelines for developing Restatements).
276. See supra Part I.B.3 (analyzing the RLLI’s proposed approach to breach of insurer
duty to defend).
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which an insurer that breaches the duty to defend loses its right to assert
any control over the defense or settlement of the claim.277
The other is section 41 addressing “Allocation in Long-Tail Harm
Claims Covered by Occurrence-Based Policies.”278 Long-tail harm refers
to “indivisible harm, whether bodily injury or property damage, that is
attributable to continuous or repeated exposure over time to the same or
similar substances or conditions or that has a long latency period.”279
Examples include latent injury claims from repeated exposure to asbestos
or other toxic substances.280
The RLLI recognizes that liability claims for long-tail harm can
present “difficult issues” where the alleged indivisible harm implicates
multiple insurance policies in effect for different periods over a relatively
long period of time, for instance several decades.281 An issue that emerges
is how courts should allocate responsibility for the indivisible harm among
insurers under policies that cover only harm that occurs during the policy
period (i.e. occurrence-based polices). Courts have developed two general
approaches to this issue: the “all sums” approach and the “pro rata”
approach.282
Under the “all sums” approach, the policyholder may recover the full
amount of a policy’s coverage limits from any of the triggered policies.283
As the RLLI recognizes, the approach is “analogous to joint and several
liability in tort” in that it permits a policyholder to selectively recover from
an insurer until the limits of the policy are exhausted and then seek
recovery under another triggered policy, and so on, until the claim is either
paid or the limits of all of the triggered policies are exhausted.284 Under the
“pro rata” approach, courts allocate the amounts paid to claimants equally
across all triggered years, beginning with the first year in which harm
occurred and ending with the last year in which harm triggered an
occurrence-based policy (and including any years in which coverage was
not procured).285
Accordingly, the policyholder may recover that
proportional amount of the covered losses allocated to the triggered
277. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIAB. INS. § 19 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
278. Id. § 41.
279. Id. § 41 cmt. a.
280. See id. § 41 ill. 1–4 (discussing examples of long-tail harms).
281. Id. § 41 cmt. a.
282. See id. § 41 cmt. c (discussing theories of allocation for long-tail harms).
283. See id. (discussing the “all sums” approach to allocation for long-tail harms).
284. Id.
285. See id. (discussing the “pro rata” approach to allocation for long-tail harms). The
approach adopted in the RLLI is also referred to as the “pro rata by years” or “time on the
risk” approach. Id.
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policy’s period, up to the policy’s coverage limit.286
The RLLI adopts the “pro rata” approach as the default rule.287 It
concludes that the approach provides “the most consistent, simplest, and
fairest solution” to the allocation problem for long-tail harm claims.288 The
reason this approach may be characterized as “insurer-friendly” is that an
insurer is ultimately subject to the lesser of a pro rata share of its triggered
policy’s coverage limit or that coverage limit, as opposed to full exhaustion
of the triggered policy under the all sums approach. Nevertheless, as the
RLLI acknowledges, “a clear majority of the jurisdictions that have
addressed the question have adopted the pro rata approach.”289
Other than recommending these two majority rules, the RLLI does not
appear to endorse any other rule––majority or minority––involving a split
of case law authority in a manner that favors insurers. Indeed, comments
discussing the RLLI’s pro rata default rule suggest that certain policy
language could be interpreted as all sums, which may undercut the extent to
which that rule may be characterized as favorable to insurers.290 In any
event, the juxtaposition of these two “insurer-friendly” majority rules, one
of which affects only a narrow set of policies and circumstances (i.e. longtail harm claims covered by occurrence-based policies), with other RLLI
rules discussed in Part II that generally impact all liability insurance
policies, and are poised to significantly enhance insurer liability and costs,
reveals an unmistakable imbalance. Insurers who comprise half of the
liability insurance equation are disadvantaged by the cumulative impact of
the RLLI’s proposed rules so that the policyholders who comprise the other
half may obtain new and greater advantages.
If a court adopted the RLLI lock, stock and barrel, an insurer in any
jurisdiction in the United States would be subject to increased liability
exposure or defense costs, and most likely both. This is because the RLLI
is littered with novel rule formulations, both large and small, that propose
to increase insurers’ liability and costs at every stage of the insurance
procurement and claims handling process. As discussed, an insurer would
be more limited under the RLLI in its ability to challenge and void a policy
based on a material misrepresentation (sections 7–9), deny a defense at the
286. See id. (describing how payments are calculated under the “pro rata” approach).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See id. § 41 cmt. d (discussing language in versions of standard commercial
general-liability (CGL) insurance policies that “does not provide any justification for
limiting an insurer’s responsibility to harm that occurs during the policy period,” and, at
most, “creates an ambiguity regarding the question of allocation . . . [that] should be
construed against the drafter”).
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outset of a claim (section 13), or terminate an existing defense (section 18).
An insurer would also be unable to recoup any costs it was not obligated to
provide under a policy (section 21). In addition, an insurer would be
subject to an expanded scope of bad faith liability for any unintentional
breach of the duty to make reasonable settlement decisions (section 24), for
instance by rejecting any settlement offer deemed “reasonable” with the
benefit of hindsight or possibly by failing to make a reasonable settlement
offer or counteroffer. This breach would then subject the insurer to liability
for extra-contractual damages comparable to bad faith damages (section
27), including the full amount of any excess judgment and any other
foreseeable harm. All the while, the specter of new direct liability would
loom over the insurer (section 12) for any failure to exercise reasonable
care in the selection of defense counsel to represent the policyholder or for
any insurer conduct that could be said to override the professional
judgment of that selected counsel.
These RLLI rules, and others discussed, combine to propose a liability
insurance regime that is truly novel. In doing so, the RLLI implicates the
same concerns expressed by Justice Scalia that “modern Restatements . . .
must be used with caution” by courts where these work products “have
abandoned the mission of describing the law, and have chosen instead to
set forth their aspirations for what the law ought to be.”291 Although the
RLLI contains numerous provisions that are not aspirational, the fact it
contains a significant number of provisions that are clearly aspirational
should present major red flags to any court relying on this work product.
The RLLI departs from the ALI’s own instructions that Restatements
“restate” clear formulations of common law “as it presently stands,” be
“constrained by the need to find support in sources of law,” and avoid
proposing “major innovations in matters of public policy.”292
Public policy arguments can be made for or against any of the novel
rules put forth in the RLLI, but that is not what a Restatement is designed
to accomplish nor what courts have come to expect from Restatements over
the past century. Restatements are supposed to provide an educational
resource for courts on the prevailing or best-reasoned state common law
rules, not an academic exercise in which to recommend new liability
regimes.293 In this regard, the RLLI falls short and appears instead to invite
major innovations in matters of public policy that increase insurers’
liability and costs.
291. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
292. ALI STYLE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 3, 6.
293. See supra Part I.0 (providing an overview of the Restatement development process).
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The ALI’s stamp of approval on the RLLI puts the organization at a
crossroads with respect to modern Restatements.294 Throughout the RLLI’s
development, an incredible number of submissions, often painstakingly
researched, were made to the RLLI Reporters, ALI Council and leadership,
and general membership identifying novel project provisions and ringing
alarm bells.295 The ALI Council and leadership made important course
corrections along the way, including the postponement of multiple project
votes and the insistence on several major rule changes on the eve of the
RLLI’s final approval by the ALI membership, but these laudable efforts
did not fully address the RLLI’s novel features. Rather, piecemeal changes
to especially jarring one-sided provisions provided Band-Aids for a project
developed with a purpose to innovate in matters of public policy and move
the law in a particular direction. It remains to be seen whether in the future
the ALI embraces having aspirational Restatements or shuns them to avoid
backlash, such as by judges adopting Justice Scalia’s view that the work
products deserve little weight296 or by repudiations from state
legislatures.297 The RLLI can either serve as a clear “wake up” call against
including novel legal rules in Restatements or as a call to arms for
leveraging the Restatement “brand” in future projects to propose novel
legal rules intended to revise rather than restate law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The ALI’s foray into restating the law of liability insurance has been
subject to wide-ranging criticisms, particularly among stakeholders in the
insurer community, to the point where multiple state legislatures have taken
the unprecedented step of enacting laws to repudiate the entire
Restatement. This article has provided a comprehensive analysis of the
RLLI to assist judges and others debating whether to rely upon the project
as an authoritative source of liability insurance rules. As discussed
throughout this article, criticisms of the RLLI expressed by insurers, ALI
members, and others appear well founded. The project’s history is replete
with proposed departures in the common law, and the final RLLI

294. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 14 (discussing the reputation of the ALI).
295. See supra note 51 (noting multi-volume appendix with more than 1,200 pages of
materials submitted throughout the RLLI’s development).
296. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring and
dissenting in part) (stating view that courts should be wary of modern Restatements that fail
to accurately describe the law).
297. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text (discussing actions taken by state
legislatures to prevent courts from adopting RLLI provisions).
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incorporates novel provisions that would, if adopted by courts,
systematically change the liability insurance landscape in ways that would
increase insurers’ liability and costs. Accordingly, judges contemplating
proposed RLLI rules should exercise caution and not presume a
recommended rule is firmly grounded in existing common law. Judges
should proceed with the understanding that the RLLI represents an effort to
reshape rather than restate the law.

